1954 MarsdenLR 164
HIGH COURT MALAYA PENANG
WONG KOK KEONG – Appellant
Versus
REGINA – Respondent
[Criminal Appeal No: 51 Of 1954]
Spenser Wilkinson J:
The appellant having crossed the ferry to Butterworth in a car driven by PW4 left the cat at Mitchell Pier, went through the Customs Barrett on foot and rejoined the car outside a coffee shop at the corner of Pantai Road He Was observed getting into the car by a Revenue Officer, PW5 as a result of which a Senior Revenue Officer chased the car and stopped it at Bagan Luar Road, where it was being re-filled with petrol The appellant was seen to be wearing an old wrist watch with what was described as "a new gold strap" of somewhat unusual design The appellant was then asked if he had further dutiable goods and he then produced what was described as a medal or gold sovereign which he had in his pocket.
Neither of these articles had been declared and by Legal Notification No. 527 of 1954 gold had been made dutiable on 22 September 1954 just over a fortnight earlier.
The wrist strap and the medal were sent by the Customs authorities to the Government Chemist, who gave his certificate to the effect that these articles were of gold, a copy of which certificate was served upon the appellant on 18 October 1954 The trial having commenced on 28 October 1954 this certificate had not been served ten clear days before the commencement of the trial, and the first and most important point that arose in this appeal was whether in the circumstances this certificate was admissible in evidence.
There is unfortunately a conflict of judicial decision with regard to the effect of the admission of certificates under s. 427 of the Criminal Procedure Code in cases where a copy of the certificate has not been served within the time laid down in that Section In these circumstances I think it best, before considering the authorities, to endeavour to construe the relevant Sections according to the established rules of interpretation The wording of s. 427(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (omitting only the words relating to the Registrar of Criminals which are not relevant to the question now before me) is as follows:
427(1) . Any document purporting to be a report under the hand of any of the persons mentioned in sub-section (2) of this section upon any person, matter or thing examined or analyzed by him..... may be given in evidence in any enquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code unless such person......... shall be required to attend as a witness -
(a) by the Court; or
(b) by the accused, in which case the accused shall give notice to the Public Prosecutor not less than three clear days before the commencement of the trial:
Provided always that in any case in which the Public Prosecutor intends to give in evidence any such report he shall deliver a copy thereof to the accused not less than ten clear days before the commencement of the trial.
Sub-section (2) of this Section sets out a list of the persons whose certificates can be given and sub-section (3) provides that those person are bound to state the truth in reports made under their hands.
I understand the rule with regard to the construction of provisos to be that laid down in Jennings v. Kelly [1940] AC 206 that "there is no rule that the first or enacting part is to be construed without reference to proviso The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction, which is that a section or enactment must be constructed as a whole, each portion throwing light if need be on the rest".
The first point to be noted, I think, is that apart from s. 427 a report made by any person is not evidence This is clearly laid down by s. 60 of the Evidence Ordinance which enacts with reference to the opinions of experts the "Oral evidence must in all cases whatever be direct:
(d) If it refers to an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is held, it must be the evidence of the person who holds that opinion on those grounds.
There appears to be some repugnancy between this Section and s. 427 Of the Criminal Procedure Code. I think, therefore, that s. 427 must be looke