Thomson CJ (delivering oral judgement of the Court):

We have come to certain conclusions regarding this case and there is no reason why they should not be stated here and now.

This appellant and another man were tried at the Ipoh Assizes before Mr. Justice Azmi and a jury for the murder of one Tangamani s/o Narayanan at Sengat Estate on or about 28 December 1959, in contravention of s. 302 of the Penal Code. The appellant was convicted by a majority verdict and sentenced to death. His co-accused was found not guilty.

In the case of each accused the main part of the evidence against him was a confession alleged to have been made before the Ipoh Magistrate. In each case there was a certain amount of corroboration of the contents of the confession, but I think it is only fair to say that in each case without the confession there was nothing like the necessary quantum of evidence to support a conviction. With the confessions, however, there is no room for doubt that there was ample evidence in each case to support a conviction.

In the case of each accused it was the prosecution case that the confession had been made freely and voluntarily and that its contents were true. In each case it was the story of the accused that the confession was untrue and involuntary and had been extorted from him by various oppressive practices on the part of the Police.

The question of "free and voluntary" was considered in the first instance by the trial Judge when the admissibility of the confessions was challenged and he came to conclusions unfavourable to each accused and allowed the confessions to be read in evidence. In his charge to the jury, however, he reminded them that although the confessions had been read to them it was for them to say whether they were satisfied that the confessions had been made voluntarily and whether they were satisfied that the contents of them were true. It would appear that as regards the two confessions the jury came to opposite conclusions. As regards the appellant's co-accused it is quite clear that for some reason or other they were not prepared to rely on it. In the case of the appellant it is clear they did place some reliance on it.

What has been attacked before us is the way the learned trial Judge dealt with these confessions in his charge to the jury. It is said, and to a large extent we agree, that these confessions were denied at the trial by the parties who had made them. Neither accused went into the witness box, but each of them made a statement from the dock in which be alleged that the confession was extorted from him by torture, that the contents were not true and that he had no connection whatsoever with the murder. In the circumstances we were told the trial Judge should have directed the jury to approach the question raised by the confessions with very great care. He should have impressed upon them the desirability of looking for corroboration and he should have impressed upon them the fact that although by reason of the relevant section in the Evidence Ordinance the confession of one accused might be taken into consideration as against his co-accused, yet much less weight should be attached to it than to any other sort of evidence.

As I have said, we agree. I would, however, at this stage read some observations by the late Mr. Darling J in the case of The King v. Meade [1909] 1 KB 895, 898:

It is necessary to repeat what has often been said before in this Court, namely, that when a Judge sums up to a jury he must not be taken to be indicting a treatise on the law. He addresses himself to the particular facts of the case then before the jury, and no Judge can affect, in those circumstances, to give an exhaustive definition or one which applies to every conceivable case.

These words are very much in point here. It is true that Azmi J, did not enunciate a series of propositions of law, that he did not in terms say to the jury: these are retracted confessions; you must regard them