Ambrose J:

In this case the accused was charged in the District Court as follows:

That he, on or about 16 February 1957, at about 8.00 p.m. at Singapore, having a contract with the Singapore City Council, did corruptly give to an agent, namely, GM Richards, the acting Chief Engineer (Construction) of the Sewerage Department of the City Council, the sum of one thousand dollars as an inducement or reward for showing favour to himself in relation to his principal's affairs, and thereby committed an offence under s. 3(b) and punishable under s. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (Ch 121).

Counsel for the appellant contended that there was insufficient evidence that the appellant had a contract with the City Council. The evidence adduced by the prosecution as to the contract was the oral evidence of PC Parry, the Deputy Chief Engineer, and GM Richards, the Chief Engineer, Planning & Designing, Sewerage Department, City Council. Parry testified that the appellant had a minor sewer contract with the City Council on 16 February 1957. Richards testified that the appellant was working on the construction of minor sewers. Counsel contended that the contract must be proved by the production of the document embodying the terms of the contract. Counsel relied on s. 64 of the Evidence Ordinance. This provides that "documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases hereinafter mentioned." All that this section means is that, if it is desired to prove the contents of a document, the document itself must, save in certain exceptional cases, be produced. In my opinion it was unnecessary to produce any document embodying the terms of the contract. Proof of the existence of a contract must be distinguished from proof of the terms of a contract. Under s. 92 of the Evidence Ordinance the terms of a contract, which has been reduced to the form of a document, can only be proved by production of the document (or secondary evidence in a proper case). But, in my view, the existence of a contract or contractual relationship may be proved by oral evidence. One example of this rule is R v. Holy Trinity hellip; Hull [1827] 7 B & C 611. In that case the question was whether a pauper had gained a settlement in a certain parish by the occupation of a tenement. Parol evidence was admitted to prove the mere fact of tenancy, although it had been created by a written document. Another example is Alderson v. Clay [1816], 1 Stark 405, where it was held that the fact of partnership may be proved by parol evidence of the acts of the parties without producing the partnership deed.

Secondly, Counsel for the appellant contended that GM Richards was the Chief Engineer, Planning & Designing, Sewerage Department, City Council, on 16 February 1957 and, therefore, was not in a position to show favour on 16 February 1957. But according to the evidence adduced by the prosecution, Richards would have become Chief Engineer (Construction) as from Monday, 18 February, from which day the appellant's construction work would have been under the supervision of Richards and Richards would have been in a position to show favour to the appellant. Here it must be pointed out that there is no onus on the prosecution to prove that Richards was in a position to show favour at the time the appellant gave him the money. This is clear from the case of R v. Dickinson & de Rable 33 Cr App R 5. It was sufficient to show that Richards was an agent of a public body as defined in s. 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance.

Thirdly, Counsel for the appellant contended that the evidence for the prosecution showed that the money was not given as an inducement or reward for showing favour as Richards was never asked to show any favour. Under s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance, however, when it is proved that any money has been given to a person in the employment of a public body by a person holding a contract from the public body, such money shall be deem