Rigby J:

This case has taken a great deal of time and a considerable volume of evidence has been heard, but having regard to the view that I have clearly formed on the evidence I consider that no useful purpose can be served by my reserving judgment.

This is a husband's petition for divorce on the ground of desertion without reasonable cause for the necessary statutory period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. The Petition was presented on the 20 August 1966. The respondent, by her answer, denied that she was guilty of desertion. She further prayed for a decree to be granted in her favour on the ground that the petitioner had himself been guilty of physical cruelty and/or by his conduct and treatment of her he had compelled her to leave the matrimonial home and so he himself had been guilty of desertion.

There was a further prayer at the conclusion of her answer to the petition, in which she asked for a decree in her favour on the ground that the petitioner since the date of the alleged desertion, on the 5 October 1952, had himself habitually committed adultery with a woman or women unknown. It is right that I should say at once that that allegation was struck out from her answer at an early stage in these proceedings, and before the trial before me, on the total inability of the respondent to give further and better particulars of any of those acts of adultery or as to the name of any woman or women concerned. Her answer before this Court proceeded, therefore, solely on her allegations of cruelty and/or constructive desertion.

The parties were married in Singapore on the 1 March 1947. At the time of the marriage the petitioner was a bachelor, aged 29, and the respondent a widow, aged 43. The petitioner was then a Cadet in the Malayan Civil Service. After the marriage the parties lived together at various addresses in Malaya, at which the husband was stationed, and also proceeded on leave to England in 1950. The petitioner's case is that although the respondent was reasonably happy and contented in Malaya throughout the greater part of their married life in this country she hankered, and was continually hankering, to return to London; that on three previous occasions between March and June 1952, she booked her passage to return to England and that he dissuaded her from so going; but that finally in August 1952, she again booked her passage and that, despite his endeavours to persuade her to the contrary, she packed up and sailed on the 5 October 1952. That she did, in fact, sail on that date - and against the petitioner's wishes - is indisputable.

The sole issue for consideration - as I understand it - is as to whether she had sufficient justification in law to entitle her to leave the matrimonial home. The respondent seeks to justify her action by saying that the physical cruelty of her husband and his general conduct towards her was such as to compel her to leave him, so that he was himself guilty of what is known as constructive desertion. What is meant by constructive desertion is very clearly set out in the headnote to the case of Lang v. Lang [1955] AC, 402; [1954] 3 WLR 762; [1954] 3 All ER 571, PC, and I propose to read it. It states:

Where a husband's conduct towards his wife was such that a reasonable man would know - that the husband must have known - that in all probability it would result in the departure of the wife from the matrimonial home, that, in the absence of rebutting evidence, was sufficient proof of an intention on his part to disrupt the home, and the fact that he nevertheless desired or requested her to stay did not rebut the intention to he inferred from his acts - that he intended to drive her out - and he was guilty of constructive desertion.

Now I have considerable sympathy for the respondent in this case. It is clear that to all intents and purposes she had severed her connection with this country while, on the other hand, her husband co