At the conclusion of the case for the Plaintiffs and on submissions made by Dr. Withers-Payne for the Defendant, I dismissed the claim with costs, and the counterclaim being thereupon withdrawn, I said that I would give my reasons later, in writing.

During numerous adjournments which had been necessary I had had ample opportunity of considering the claim and pleadings in the suit and also, from time to time, the evidence given by the 1st Plaintiff M. K. Varma and his witnesses.

I had also anticipated that Dr. Withers-Payne would at the close of the Plaintiffs case, make the submissions he did.

These submissions were two-fold (a) a point of law and (b) on the facts, namely that the Plaintiffs had wholly failed to prove and substantiate their claims and allegations.

Dr. Withers-Payne submitted firstly that the two Plaintiffs were not entitled to maintain this suit in their personal capacities as individuals and as framed in the Writ of Summons.

The endorsement of the Writ of Summons claims damages for breach of an agreement dated the 3rd April 1947. The action is therefore one based on contract. The breach of this agreement made between the Plaintiffs and Defendant as alleged is failure to manage and run a Cinema, known as the Hind Theatre at Sembawang, in accordance with the terms and conditions of this agreement. The Statement of Claim amplifies this endorsement and attaches a copy of this agreement.

It is not alleged anywhere in the Writ of Summons or Statement of Claim that the two Plaintiffs are suing for and on behalf of a partnership but it is abundantly clear, not only from a perusal of this agreement but from the evidence subsequently given, that this agreement was in fact entered into, as specifically recited therein, by the two Plaintiffs as partners in and for and on behalf of a partnership which was running this Hind Theatre and had been running it for approximately six months prior to the date of this agreement, apart from any verbal evidence in this respect and which was wholly unreliable, the agreement itself, together with the certificate of the Registrar of Business Names (Exhibit D. 3) which shows that this partnership commenced in October 1946, proves these facts conclusively.

The first point is therefore, can the two Plaintiffs maintain this suit in their personal and individual capacities for breach of an agreement which they have entered into as agents for disclosed principals? I was and am of the opinion that they cannot. I would here refer to the original defence filed on the 26th November 1948 which specifically raises this point after there had previously been correspondence between the respective solicitors and a demand made (27.9.48) for names of the partners and details. This demand was refused, such refusal being persisted in and there has been no amendment sought by the Plaintiffs of the form in which the suit was commenced, in order to comply with the Special Procedure laid down by Order 46 and rules thereunder. This procedure is applicable but I agree that where it is not applicable, partners may sue or be sued individually in their own names.

The Plaintiffs had the alternatives of joining all the Partners as Plaintiffs or of taking advantage of the special procedure by suing in the firm name. They have consistently refused to do so.

Dr. Withers-Payne referred to authorities of which Re Vagliano Anthracite Colliery Co Ltd 103 LTR 211 and Performing Right Society Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties (1924) 1 AC 1 at p 18 appear to be particularly relevant in these respects. Unless the partners are named, the firm is not before the Court. I would also refer to Lindley, 10th Edition at p. 348: "With respect to other simple contracts, whether written or verbal, where a contract is entered into with several persons jointly they should all join in an action upon it." And again at page 350: "One partner may sue alone on a written contract made with himself if it