Poyser CJ:

The judgment of the Court of Appeal (Poyser CJ, Terrell JA & Cussen J) was as follows:

We dismissed this appeal, and at the conclusion of the arguments stated that we would give a written judgment on the points of law raised.

The appellant was convicted on the following charges:

First, That you at Kuala Lipis in the State of Pahang on or about 8 February 1938 being a public servant namely a police officer agreed to accept from the Pahang Lin Siong Motor Co. Ltd., a gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive for forbearing to do an official act and thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 161 of the Penal Code".

Secondly, That you at Kuala Lipis in the State of Pahang on or about 15 February 1939 being a public servant namely a police officer accepted from the Pahang Lin Siong Motor Co. Ltd., a gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive for forbearing to do an official act and thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 161 of the Penal Code".

He was sentenced to twelve months simple imprisonment on each charge, the sentences to run concurrently.

There were also two alternative charges, viz:

First, That you between 1 February 1938 and 3 August 1939, being a public servant agreed to accept for yourself a valuable thing to wit sums of money amounting to $630 without consideration from the Pahang Lin Siong Motor Co. Ltd., whom you knew to have been or to be likely to be concerned in the official functions of yourself as Officer in Charge of Police District, Lipis, and of the members of the police force in the said District subordinate to you and thereby committed an offence under s. 165 of the Penal Code".

Secondly, That you, on or about 15 February 1939, at Kuala Lipis, being a public Servant namely a police officer (officer in charge of Police District , Lipis) accepted for yourself a valuable thing to wit a sum of $40 without consideration from one S Suppiah Managing Director of the Pahang Lin Siong Motor Co. Ltd., whom you then knew to be likely to be concerned with the official function of yourself as such Officer in Charge of Police District, Lipis, and of the public servants being members of the Police force the said District subordinate to you, and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 165 of the Penal Code".

In view of the appellant's conviction on the first two charges, the Judge made no finding on these alternative charges.

The following were the appellant's main grounds of appeal:

(2) . "Charge headed `alternatively first' is bad in law:

(a) for multiplicity;

(b) for it covers a period exceeding 12 months.

(3) .The charges are bad in law for uncertainty, in as much as it is uncertain whether the charges under 'alternatively' are alternate to the preceding charges respectively, or to the second charge only, or that the charge headed 'alternatively first' is an alternative to the preceding charge and that the charge following is a charge standing alone".

Mr. Salt, on behalf of the appellant, argued that the first alternative charge referred to a transaction distinct from the transaction referred to in the first charge, and was therefore bad, as in effect he was charged that he either did an act on one day at one place or another act, constituting a different offence, on another day at another place.

In support of this argument he cited Sohoni, 13th Edn. p. 584, and further argued that it was not an irregularity but an illegality, and that the conviction must be set aside having regard to the decision in Subramania lyer v. King Emperor, 28 Indian Appeals 257. It is quite clear in our opinion that the first alternative charge was alternative to the first charge. The difference in the dates appears to be due to the fact that in the original charge no date was mentioned, and when the first charge was amended by the insertion of a date, a different date was inserted in the alternative charge, possibly by inadvertence.

We do not, ho