1961 MarsdenLR 46
HIGH COURT (SINGAPORE)
BUTTROSE, J
M N O
versus
THE COMPTROLLER OF INCOME TAX
INCOME TAX SPECIAL CASE NO. 1 OF 1961
Decided On : 04-21-61
For the appellant - GS Hill; Rodyk & Davidson For the respondent - Lim Chor Pee (Crown Counsel); State Advocate-General
Buttrose J:
This is a case stated under s. 82 of the Income Tax Ordinance (Ch 166), hereinafter referred to as 'the Ordinance', by the Income Tax Board of Review for the opinion of the High Court.
The facts were that the appellant during the year 1958 being the basis period for the year of assessment 1959, made contributions to the Central Provident Fund Board in respect of a domestic employee (a house amah) employed by him during that year in amounts totalling $92.50. These contributions are obligatory as prescribed by the Central Provident Fund Ordinance (Ch 150). The appellant claimed these contributions as a deduction in ascertaining his chargeable income but the Comptroller disallowed them as such. Thereupon the appellant appealed to the Board of Review under s. 79(1) of the Ordinance and on the appeal coming on for hearing the Board resolved to state a case for the opinion of the High Court.
The sole question of law for decision was:-
In calculating the appellant's chargeable income, is the sum of $92,50 an allowable deduction under the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance?
The appellant at the material time was a Civil Servant....... and his income consisted only of his salary from his employment. He had no other sources of income.
The appellant's case was that this sum of $92.50 is an allowable deduction -
(i) under s. 39(2)(e) of the Ordinance being a contribution to an approved provident fund; and further or in the alternative;
(ii) under s. 14(1)(e) of the Ordinance being a sum contributed by an employer to an approved provident fund in respect of any of his employees.
such contributions being obligatory by reason of the provisions of the Central Provident Fund Ordinance and the rules made thereunder and it is not in dispute that they were.
I propose to deal first with s. 14(1)(e) and the material part of that section in so far as this appeal is concerned reads as follows:-
14(1)"For the purpose of ascertaining the income of any person for any period from any source chargeable with tax............ there shall be deducted all outgoings and expenses wholly and exclusively incurred during the period by such person in the production of the income, including -
(e) any sum contributed by an employer to an approved......... provident fund in respect of any of his employees the contribution of which sum by the employer was obligatory.
Now, the word "including" used in the section is a term of extension and not of restrictive definition. This was clearly established in Savoy Hotel Co. v. London County Council [1900] 1 QB 665 at p. 669 and see also The Queen v. Hermann 4 QB 284 at p. 288 and Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps [1899] AC 99 at pp 105 and 106. It was not inaptly defined, I think, by Mr. Hill during the course of his argument as meaning "and the following" and the inference is that what is set out after the word "including" is something which would not normally fall within the main words of the definition. Sub-p.graphs (a) to (h) of sub-section (1) of s. 14 are not exhaustive and sub-para (e) is not, in my opinion, governed by the words "wholly and exclusively incurred..... in the production of the income" and should be read without reference to them. That this is so becomes apparent when all the sub-paragraphs are examined. If, for example, we take sub-para (f) which deals with `zakat' and `fitrah' it is quite clear that they are not wholly and exclusively incurred in the production of income. Similarly, with regard to bad debts in sub-para (d), capital expenditure in sub-para (g) and such other deductions as may be prescribed in sub-para (h). Furthermore, the section applies to income from all sources and is not therefore, in my opinion, restricted to trade expenses.
s. 14 of the Ordinance has no counterpart as a single section under either English or Australian legislation but it does not contain the restrictions of the English s. 379 or the Australian s. 66 the equivalent of sub-para (