Adams J:

This was an application by Summons in Chambers by the defendant residing at 22 Jalan Penggaram, Batu Pahat, for an order under O. 65 r. 6A that the plaintiff be ordered to provide security for costs. Mr. Ramason appeared for the applicant/defendant and Mr. McLeod for the plaintiff.

The action is one for the price of goods sold and delivered, namely live sheep which it is alleged were delivered to the defendant between December 1959 and August 1960. The defendant disputes the amount owing.

The plaintiff company is a company incorporated in the State of Singapore and although it is alleged that the plaintiff company have a branch in the Federation of Malaya at 28 Brickfields Road, Kuala Lumpur, the managing director's affidavit sworn on 22 March 1961, does not say that the plaintiff company are the owners of the premises nor does he say that the plaintiff company is the owner of any immovable property whatsoever in the Federation.

When the matter was argued before me in Chambers I refused the application on the authority of Coldham v. Raub Australian Gold Mining Co. Ltd. [1940] MLJ 51 which was cited to me by Mr. McLeod. But before the end of Chambers Mr. Ramason asked me to reopen the matter as he had failed to bring to my attention the much more recent case of Ng Hui Lip & Anor. V. Chan Hwa Cheng & Ors. in which Smith J refused to follow the decision in the Coldham case. He submitted that I had powers to do so citing Re Harrison's Settlement [1955] Ch. 260; [1955] 2 WLR 256; [1955] 1 All ER 185 as authority. I said that I would adjourn the matter to open Court which I did. The matter was then further argued.

Mr. McLeod objected on the grounds that I had already made the order but I clearly have power to reconsider before the order is drawn up and issued.

With respect to the learned CJ who decided the Coldham case, I think he was wrong in saying that he would refuse to grant security for costs on the ground that the Straits Settlements Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Ordinance was in pari materia with the Judgments Extension Act of 1868. It happens that that part of his judgment is obiter dictum because he in fact decided the case by holding that the facts of the particular application did not warrant his exercising his discretion to order security.

I must therefore follow the judgment of Smith J in Ng Hui Lip case in so far as he decided that the fact that the plaintiff is resident in Singapore is not a ground for refusing to order security for costs because the registration in Singapore of a judgment issued by the Supreme Court of the Federation of Malaya is not automatic. It is a process which involves a judicial officer being put in motion and which may be the subject of dispute. Both the Coldham case and the Ng Hui Lip case were concerned with s. 369 of the Civil Procedure Code. This has been replaced by O. 65 r. 6A of the Rules of the Supreme Court. This is identical with the English rule. It appears from the commentary in the Annual Practice that where the plaintiff is resident abroad security for costs will be ordered. Order 65 r. 6A is very short and it is not so elaborate as s. 369 of the Civil Procedure Code which requires the defendant to show that the plaintiff possesses sufficient immovable property within the Federation to satisfy the judgment of costs. The plaintiff company admits that the defendant has been to their premises in Brickfields Road. The defendant has deposed that he was informed (no doubt by the managing director) that the plaintiff company do not have any property movable or immovable in the Federation of Malaya. The managing director in his affidavit does not deny that they have no immovable property. He merely deposes that the value of furniture and fittings and sundry debtors in the Federation of Malaya amounts to $50,000. He does not say how much of this sum is represented by sundry debtors. Such movable property as this can scarcely be said to provide adequate secu