Ambrose J:

This appeal raised the question whether a piece of land which was leased by the Crown to the Services' Lands Board is Crown land within the meaning of s. 2 of the Crown Lands Encroachments Ordinance. The answer to this question involved consideration of the interesting point whether under the Singapore Constitution which was promulgated on 3 June 1959 the Crown is one and indivisible as far as Singapore is concerned.

The facts were these. On 1 January 1958, a War Department Land Agent issued a licence to Lim Kien Mok for the temporary occupation of a portion of a piece of land, which was then Crown land occupied by the War Department. On 28 May 1959 the Crown leased the piece of land to the Services' Lands Board for nine hundred and ninety-nine years from 1 January 1959. This Board is a corporation incorporated in Singapore under the Services' Lands Board Ordinance, 1959, which came into operation on 13 February 1959. A notice to quit dated 30 March 1962 and addressed to Lim Kien Mok was posted on the same day on the main door of a house situated on the area occupied by Lim. The notice required Lim to quit the area on 30 April 1962, or other the day on which the current month of his licence would expire next after the end of one calendar month from the date of his being served with the notice. On 31 May 1962, a complaint was made by Brian Herbert Kevan, a War Department Land Agent and Deputy Collector of Land Revenue, to a Magistrate against Lim under s. 2 of the Crown Lands Encroachments Ordinance, alleging that he was given a month's notice to quit on 30 March 1962, but had not vacated the portion of the Crown land occupied by him. Lim was summoned to answer the complaint. The Magistrate's Court found that the notice to quit had been duly served, and that Lim was in unlawful occupation of Crown land, and made an order for a warrant for dispossession to be issued, but stayed execution of the warrant pending the disposal of the present appeal.

The first question I considered was whether the learned Magistrate erred in law in holding that the notice to quit had been duly served on Lim. The rule as regards service on a tenant is that a notice left at a tenant's house, but not served on any one personally, is effectual if it can be proved that it actually came to his hands in time to give him notice of the proper length: 23 Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., p. 526. The complaint was made by the complainant to the Magistrate on 31 May 1962. And the complainant alleged in the complaint that the notice to quit was given on 30 March 1962. I inferred from those two facts that the complaint was that Lim failed to quit the area occupied by him on 30 April 1962. The complainant had, therefore, to prove that the notice came to Lim's hands on 30 March 1962, to give him one month's notice as required under the conditions of the licence. As the complainant failed to prove this, I reversed the Magistrate's finding that the notice to quit had been duly served and that Lim was in unlawful occupation of Crown land, and set aside the order that a warrant for dispossession be issued.

Thus it became unnecessary for me to consider the question set out at the outset of this judgment. But I was urged by both Counsel to decide it as it was a question of considerable importance to the parties and involved an important constitutional question. It was contended by Counsel for Lim, the appellant, that the piece of land leased to the Services' Lands Board was not Crown land. This contention was based on two propositions: first, the word "Crown" in the Crown Lands Encroachments Ordinance means the Crown in right of Singapore; secondly, the Board did not hold the land as agent of the Crown in right of Singapore. It was contended by Counsel for the respondent that the land held by the Board is Crown land. This contention was based on two propositions: first, the Crown is one and indivisible; secondly, the land was held by the Board a