Rigby J:

This is an application to vary the Conditions of Sale in respect of the house and land comprising No. 125, York Road, Penang, the property of one Lee Kee Pin, pursuant to an Order made by me on 28 November 1960.

The history of the proceedings giving rise to this application are as follows. In July 1959 the Bank of China, as plaintiffs, sued Lee Kee Pin, as defendant, by way of Specially Indorsed Writ, for the sum of $ 574,000 odd being moneys lent to and paid on behalf of the defendant by the Bank in the course of its ordinary banking transactions, together with the interest and bank charges due and payable thereon. Considerable difficulty was experienced in effecting service of the Writ on the defendant and an Order for substituted service had to be obtained. The defence was then filed pleading, inter alia, that by virtue of the provisions of the 1958 Banking Ordinance the plaintiffs had no right to sue for the money owing to them. That preliminary plea, which was wholly devoid of any equitable merit, was heard and dismissed by this Court in November 1959. An appeal against that decision was lodged but later withdrawn. Pleadings in the action closed in December 1959 but notwithstanding that fact, despite repeated written requests, the defendant failed to file any Affidavit of Documents until an Order to do so was issued by me in Chambers, it the instance of the plaintiffs, in February 1960. In March 1960 the case was transferred into the Fixing List for a date to be fixed for hearing. In April the plaintiffs obtained an Order for lis pendens in respect of the defendant's property, including the house at 125, York Road. In May a Consent Order was made for accounts to be taken. In September after accounts and inquiries had been taken and made before him the Registrar issued his Certificate that the plaintiffs were entitled to payment from the defendant of $520,654.99. In

October no payment whatsoever having been made by the defendant of any of the moneys found due by him to the plaintiff Bank, the Bank applied by way of Originating Summons for an Order for sale of the defendant's two properties, one of which was 125, York Road, secured to them by the defendant by way of deposit of title deeds. Again, the defendant could not be found and an Order for substituted service had to be obtained. However, subsequently the application was heard in November 1960. At the hearing of the application it became apparent that the defendant and his family were all living at 125, York Road. Although there is no note of it upon the record, as far as my memory serves me some vague suggestion was put forward by Mr. Lim Huck Aik, as Counsel then appearing on behalf of the defendant, that there might be in existence some agreement of lease of the property between the defendant and some member of his family. What is quite clear, however, is that although there was considerable argument as to the precise terms that ought to be used in the Order for sale no mention whatsoever was made as to the existence of a definite lease of the premises. An Order was then made by me on 28 November 1960, directing, inter alia, that the premises be sold "with vacant possession but subject to the existing right of any third party, if any." In February 1961 a summons was taken out returnable before the Registrar on 7 March for an Order to proceed with the sale by public auction on 6 April subject to a reserve price fixed by the plaintiffs and approved by the Registrar. An Order was made accordingly. On 5 April a day before the sale was due to take place and after the Conditions of Sale had been sent to the defendant's solicitors for approval, the defendant's solicitors thought fit to insist that the property be sold, subject to a lease, which they produced for the first time and the existence of which had never previously been disclosed. Such is the somewhat disgraceful history of these proceedings. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that the