Lord Keith of Kinkel

My Lords,

For the reasons given in the speech to be delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Lowry, which I have read in draft and with which I agree, I would allow this appeal and make the order which he proposes.

Lord Roskill

My Lords,

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Lowry. I agree with him. For the reasons he gives I would allow this appeal and remit the case stated to the Crown Court with the directions which my noble and learned friend proposes.

Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle

My Lords,

I have read the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Lowry and, for the reasons which he gives, would remit the case stated to the Crown Court with the directions which he proposes.

Lord Lowry

My Lords,

On 13 March 1989 the appellant was convicted and conditionally discharged by the Sutton Justices for assaulting three police officers in the execution of their duty contrary to s. 51(1) of the Police Act 1964 . Her father, Edwin D'Souza, was at the same time convicted and conditionally discharged for similarly assaulting one constable. Both defendants were ordered to pay compensation and costs and both appealed to the Crown Court at Croydon, which on 20 March 1990 dismissed their appeals. The appellant appealed by case stated to the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division (Nolan LJ and Otton J), which dismissed her appeal but certified two questions as being of general public importance. They were:

1. Is a person who is lawfully detained pursuant to s. 2 and Part II of the Mental Health Act 1983 deemed to be in legal custody by virtue of s. 137 of that Act, or otherwise? 2. Does the power to enter premises by force without a warrant conferred by s. 17(1)(d) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 require that the person exercising that power is in hot pursuit of the person who is unlawfully at large, and if so, what does 'hot pursuit' mean?

The appellant, who appeals by leave of your Lordships' House, had indeed assaulted the police officers and the propriety of convicting her depended on whether at the time of the assaults the police were acting in the execution of their duty. The answer to that question depended in turn on whether the police were entitled to enter by force without a warrant the premises in which the assaults occurred.

The facts, as found by the Crown Court, were that Edwin D'Souza, his wife Clara (the patient) and the appellant lived at 28a Hampton Road Worcester Park (the house). The patient had a history of mental illness. A social worker approved under the Mental Health Act 1983 (the Act), who had seen the patient's hospital notes and had been in touch with local residents and police, was concerned about her welfare and on 21 July 1988 went to the house to speak to the occupants. He was told to go away. On 13 October 1988 the social worker pursuant to s. 135 of the Act obtained warrants to enter the house, went there with police officers and two medical practitioners and gained entry. The patient was examined by the doctors and taken to Sutton Hospital, of which the Chiltern Wing is a psychiatric unit covering the area in which the house is situated. According to s. 135, detention of the patient was lawful for 72 hours after her arrival. Pursuant to s. 13(2) of the Act, the social worker interviewed the patient and applied for her to be admitted to the hospital for assessment, and she was so admitted at 1 p.m. on 13 October 1988 on the recommendation in writing of two approved medical practitioners. The Crown Court resolved against the appellant an issue concerning the lawfulness of the patient's admission to and detention in hospital. The Divisional Court affirmed the Crown Court's view on that question and it has not been reopened in this appeal.

The further facts relevant to the questions for decision by your Lordships are set out in the case stated:

The appellant Edwin D'Souza applied for the d