Murray-Aynsley CJ:

Matters at present before the Court arose out of an application under s. 13 of Ordinance No. 22 of 1953 in which the applicant complained that the Board was wrong in law in that it held that it had no power to authorize the rent agreed upon between the parties by reason of the proviso to s. 9(i)(b). When the application was made under s. 13 the ground seems to have been merely that by reason of the fact that application was made before the present Ordinance came into force this proviso did not apply.Before me a further point of law was taken, viz. that on a true construction of the proviso it would not apply to the present case in any event.This proposition was based on an unreported judgment of Taylor J given in Originating Motion 58 of 1953 (1). I have read a copy of this judgment.The learned Judge appears to be of the opinion because the proviso refers to s. 7 to arrive at the figure of the permitted increase, the limitation of its powers by the proviso is limited to those cases in which s. 7(1)(c) applies, i.e. to cases where without an application to the Board the landlord could increase rent up to the amount set out in the First Schedule, subject to the power of the Board to make an order fixing the rent at another figure if it thought fit to do so.

I cannot agree with this construction.It involves reading words into the proviso which are not there and it results in the absurdity that where the landlord has by s. 7 a certain power of increasing rent and presumably, in the eyes of the legislature, a good excuse for doing so, the amount of the increase is strictly limited, where the landlord had no such excuse the amount of the permitted increase is unlimited. I think that the reference to s. 7(1)(c), and through it to the First Schedule, in s. 9(1)(b) of the Ordinance is merely for the purpose of showing what the permitted increase is, and s. 7(1)(c) does not cut down the generality of the limitation imposed by the proviso on the powers of the Board.

The other point arises out of the following facts: The agreement which the applicant wishes the Board to sanction was made on 11 June 1953.On 27 June the present Ordinance was assented to. On 29 June an application was made to the then Board established under the 1947 Ordinance.On 20 July the present Ordinance came into force and the old Ordinance was repealed.Both Ordinances set up ad hoc bodies with limited but not identical powers. "A Rent Conciliation Board shall be established consisting of a president and such other persons as may be appointed by the Governor by notification in the Gazette." In the present Ordinance there was no transitional provisions such as are found in Ordinance 30 of 1947.It may be that the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance of 1951 had the effect of rendering it unnecessary to make a fresh application when a new Board had been appointed. I do not express any opinion on this point but I am quite sure that when the application came up for hearing in August 1953 there was no body in existence which had power to sanction the increase asked for by the applicants.Without such sanction the rent agreed between the parties was clearly illegal.

Order accordingly.