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1996 MarsdenLR 1196

COURT OF APPEAL KUALA LUMPUR
GOH PAIK SWAN – Appellant
Versus
NG CHOO LUM – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: P-02-681 Of 1995]



Petitioner Advocates:V Muthusamy,Santhi Muthusamy ,Respondent Advocate: Saw Lip Khai,Ooi Teik Hoe

JUDGMENT

Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

[1] The only issue in this appeal is whether the respondent had a caveatable interest in the appellant's lands The learned Judge resolved that issue in the respondent's favour We disagreed with the learned Judge and held that there was no caveatable interest.

[2] Indeed, having read the record provided with great care, we formed the view that the Judge was clearly wrong and, for that reason, called upon Counsel for the respondent to support the judgment appealed from without requiring Counsel for the appellant to argue the appeal. Having heard arguments from Counsel for the respondent, we were satisfied that the preliminary view which we had formed of the matter was entirely correct. We therefore reversed the learned Judge. The reasons for our decision now follow.

[3] The brief facts of this case are as follows

[4] The appellant is the registered proprietor of two pieces of land held under Geran Mukim No GM 169 for lot No 578 and Geran Mukim No GM 170 for lot No 579 in Daerah Seberang Perai, Selatan ('the said lands'). On 4 May 1995, the appellant executed a document which reads as follows:

I Goh Phaik Swan I/C No 838323 of 12, Bunga Raya Satu, off Jalan Raja Uda, 13000, Butterworth, PW hereby agree to sell two piece of land Lot 578 & 579 Mk 9 Transkrian Sek Perai to Mr Ng Choo Lum & Ng Poon Lum at the price of RM45,000 per acre.

Hereby I received RM8,000 as deposit.

Deposit for RM8,000 will be forfeited if agreement is not make within 2 weeks date hereof.

Thank you

Your Faithfully,

Sgd.

[5] On 17 May 1995, M/s JB Lim & Associates, a firm of advocates and solicitors wrote to the appellant a letter which reads as follows:

Dear Sir/Madam,

Re: Lot No 578 & 579 Mukim 9, Transkrian, Daerah Seberang Perai Selatan

We refer to the above and inform you that pursuant to your letter dated 4 May 1995 the Intending Purchaser Ng Chu Lum & Ng Poon Lum has deposited a sum of RM35,611.30 being the balance of the deposit sum with us with the purpose of proceeding with the purchase of the subject properties

We are in the process of preparing the Sale and Purchase Agreement for your execution and shall be pleased if you could attend at our office for us to settle the terms and conditions for the Sale and Purchase Agreement.

[6] The appellant did not respond to this letter.

[7] On 19 May 1995, the respondent entered a caveat against the titles to the said lands The application for the caveat was supported by a statutory declaration by the respondent's solicitor, Mr Lim Jit Boo. In his application for the entry of a caveat in Form 19B, the respondent stated, among other things, that he had paid a sum of RM35,611.30 to M/s JB Lim & Associates in accordance with the document dated 4 May 1995, which he described as an "option". There was, however, no sale and purchase agreement either negotiated or executed by the parties.

[8] On 11 July 1995, the appellant moved the High Court under s 327 of the National Land Code 1965 ('the code') for the removal of the respondent's caveat. That application was refused by the learned Judge upon the sole ground that the respondent had a caveatable interest because the document of 4 May 1995 was an enforceable agreement by which the parties had bound themselves on the subject of the sale.

[9] Although the learned Judge referred to the decisions of this Court in Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v. Tan Hor Teng & Anor, [1995] 1 MLJ 719 and Murugappa Chettiar v. Lee Teck Mook; [1995] 1 MLJ 782; [1995] 2 CLJ 545, it would appear that he did not sufficiently appreciate the propositions established by these cases Nor did he properly apply them to the facts of the case before him. All that the learned Judge did was to find that the respondent had a caveatable interest. And on that basis he held that the caveat ought to remain. He went no further Accordingly, there was no proper exercise of discretion by the learned Judge in relation to the appellant's application. In these circumstances, it is open to this Court - i

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