The applicant, Dr Amir Hussin bin Baharuddin, an associate professor of the Faculty of Social Science at the respondent university had applied for leave to apply for an order of certiorari to remove into this court for the purpose of it being quashed the decision of the vice-chancellor of the respondent university made in exercise of his powers under its constitution contained in a letter dated 3 May 1989, refusing to renew the applicant's term as dean of its Department of Social Science.

I would, at this point, interpolate to mention that although the application before me was for leave to commence certiorari proceedings, the appropriate relief which ought to have been sought should have been for leave to commence certiorari proceedings to quash the decision refusing to reappoint him and mandamus proceedings requiring the vice-chancellor to reappoint him as such pursuant to the provisions of s 18(6) of the Constitution. However, in the view I took of the matter, this point was without significance.

I approach this application by reminding myself that under O 53 r 3, the court exercises discretion whether to grant leave to apply for judicial review. The court is here first looking only at the ex parte application and is concerned to see whether prima facie there is a genuine case for review. The principles upon which the court should act are set out in R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses [1982] AC 617 by Lord Diplock as follows:

If, on a quick perusal of the material then available, the court (that is the judge who first considers the application for leave) thinks that it discloses what might on further consideration turn out to be arguable case in favour of granting to the applicant the relief claimed, it ought in the exercise of a judicial discretion, to give him leave to apply for that relief. The discretion which the court is exercising at this stage is not the same as that which it is called upon to exercise when all the evidence is in and the matter has been fully argued at the hearing of the application.

In the present case, having regard to the importance and novelty of the issues raised, I had in the exercise of my discretion, heard not only the applicant but also the respondent in open court. (See R v IRC, ex p National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses [1982] AC 617 at p 642 F per Lord Diplock). It is true that by agreement, the oral ex parte hearing may be waived and the first application treated as the application for judicial review itself thus resulting in a saving of time and costs. (See eg R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p London Borough Brent Council [1982] QB 593 at p 642). But there was neither such agreement nor an order to treat the application for leave as the application for judicial review.

Be that as it may, whether the applicant alone or both parties, are heard, in an application for leave, the threshold test is the same: Does the applicant have an arguable case for review, a sufficient interest and has there been undue delay? I had, in the course of the hearing, to remind counsel more than once, to keep the first of these points in the forefront of their minds because of the somewhat emotive arguments addressed to me as though the application were at a full hearing after leave granted.

The essential facts fall within a short compass and may be stated thus. The applicant commenced employment with the respondent university as a lecturer in the School of Social Science as from 9 September 1975; his scheme of service comprising three grades, namely, lecturer, associate professor and professor. On 1 August 1981 the applicant attained the post of associate professor, a post he holds to the present day. The applicant had been appointed a deputy dean to the School of Social Sciences from 1 November 1976 to 15 January 1977 and there after reappointed from time to time until 31 May 1980, by the then vi