Raja Azlan Shan FJ:

Datuk Harun made a statement to the police on 22 November 1975. That was before the amendment of s. 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code which came into force on 10 January 1976. He was arrested two days later. His counsel objected to the admissibility of that statement contending that the old provisions of s. 113 still applied and it therefore follows that by virtue of that section the statement was not admissible as evidence.

The general rule is that statutes, particularly amending statutes, are prima facie prospective, and retrospective effect is not to be given to them unless by clear words or necessary implication. This presumption does not always apply in cases of legislation dealing with procedure or evidence. Before the amendment Before the amendment a statement recorded under s. 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot, by virtue of s. 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code be used as evidence against the accused. After the amendment such a statement shall be admissible in evidence, at his trial. This only means that the rule governing the manner in which such statement can be used as pvidence at his trial has been amended. The change is one in procedure; the amendment to s. 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code affected the manner in which such evidence is to be enforced. An amending statute which is purely procedurial is to be construed as retrospective in its operation, unless a contrary intention appears. In my opinion, there does not seem to be a contrary intention expressed in s. 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment and Extension) Act, 1976 that it is to operate prospectively. No person has any vested interest in the course of a procedure if during an investigation that procedure is changed. It follows that s. 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code as amended applied in this case.

Assuming the old provisions of s. 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code applied, I still think that the statement recorded under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code is not rendered inadmissible under s. 15 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1961 for the purpose of a trial into an offence under that Act, subject of course, to the stringent condition that it was voluntarily made. The old provisions of s. 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code are plainly at variance with the provisions of s. 15 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and, in my opinion, cannot be allowed to prevail over the latter for this reason. It would render s. 15 of the Prevention of Corruption Act inoperative if the accused's statement is not admissible as evidence at his trial and since the Act was enacted later than the Criminal Procedure Code, the provisions of the later Act must prevail if there is any irreconcilable contradiction between their respective provisions. In my judgment, the words "... any statement by an accused person ... made at any time ... whether in the course of a police investigation or not... shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any written law, be admissible at his trial in evidence..." are designedly very wide and fall to be widely construed, and it would be undesirable in the extreme to narrow their meaning. Admissibility of a statement is one thing; its probative value is another.

The key question was whether the statement was made voluntarily? It was stressed in argument by counsel for the defence that the moment s. 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code was read out to the accused it constituted a threat or inducement in the sense that his frame of mind was such that he was bound to make a statement truthfully, whether in answer to any questions or not, and that failure to do so would entail criminal prosecution. In that frame of mind, it was argued, he had no choice but to comply with the request. It was also contended that the accused was presumed to know the law, in particular, s. 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Dealing with the second contention, I would like to correct the fa