(delivering the judgment of the Board): This is an appeal from a Judgment and Order of the Federal Court of Malaysia (Suffian L.P., Ong Hock Sim F.J. and Wan Suleiman F.J.) dismissing an appeal by the appellant from an Order of the High Court of Malaysia (Chang Min Tat J.). The High Court dismissed an appeal against a determination by the Special Commissioners of Income Tax, whereby they had directed assessments to income tax of sums aggregating more than $10 m. to be made on the appellant in respect of 14 years extending over a period of 20 years between 1953 and 1972 inclusive. The assessments in respect of the years 1953, 1957, 1958 and 1959 (the "back years") were statute barred at the date of assessment (1972) and therefore could not be raised by the Revenue unless fraud or wilful default was proved against the appellant taxpayer. The other assessments, in respect of the years 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1966–72 inclusive were not statute barred. The Special Commissioners held that the appellant had committed fraud or wilful default, within the meaning of section 69 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1947, and that the additional assessments for the back years had been validly raised. They held further that the appellant had not shown that the Revenue's computation of his income and tax for any of the 14 years in question was excessive or erroneous.

The fact that some of the assessments were statute barred, while others were not, caused the procedure before the Special Commissioners to be a little more complicated than it would otherwise have been, and this complication lies at the root of the appeal.

A large number of issues have been raised by the appellant at various stages of the appeal, but before the Federal Court, as appears from the judgment of that court, counsel for the appellant "elected to base his appeal entirely on two issues, namely—

(1) whether the procedure followed by the Special Commissioners in arriving at their Deciding Order was correct?

(2) whether the appellant had opportunity to present his case, in other words, whether the principles of natural justice had been observed?"

Before their Lordship's Board counsel for the appellant sought to raise some entirely new issues. He also sought leave to adduce further evidence. Neither of these requests was supported by adequate reasons and their Lordships refused leave to adduce further evidence and, in accordance with their usual practice, they refused to hear argument on issues which had not been raised before the Federal Court. The appeal was therefore limited to the two issues already mentioned. The Federal Court stated in their judgment that they did not find any merit or substance in the argument for the appellant, and their Lordships are in complete agreement with that view.

It is not necessary or appropriate to refer in detail to the facts found by the Special Commissioners or to the procedure followed by them. These matters are fully explained in the Stated Case and have all been considered in the careful judgment of Chang Min Tat J. in the High Court. But as some criticism of the accuracy of the Stated Case was attempted by counsel for the appellant before the Board, their Lordships draw attention to the fact, which is narrated in the judgment of Chang Min Tat J., that the stated case was shown in draft to the appellant's solicitors and that they wrote to the Revenue stating that they had no amendment to make or additions to ask for. In these circumstances their Lordships cannot entertain any criticism of the stated case now.

The essence of the appeflant's complaint that the principles of natural justice had not been observed was that the case against him had not been put to him adequately, or in sufficient time to enable him to answer it. Such plausibility as the complaint possesses derives from the course of the procedure before the Special Commissioners. At the beginning of the hearing the Special Commissioners ruled, after heari