Suffian LP (delivering the judgment of the Court):

We dismissed this appeal and now give our reasons.

First, as regards the evidence - in our view there was clear evidence which if believed would entitle the learned trial Judge to find the accused guilty, and as the learned Judge applied the right test in considering the evidence for the defence, we were of the opinion that it would not have been right to interfere with his verdict; and we would like to deal only with Mr. Jagjit Singh's argument regarding proof of the exhibits.

The exhibits were four pistols and 175 rounds of ammunition and the accused was charged with having them under his control in a security area without lawful authority contrary to s. 57(1) of the Internal Security Act, 1960.

The accused on 4 June 1976, after interrogation, during which he said that he had hidden four guns and many rounds of ammunition in two tins and a plastic bag in Kampong Hailam, led Inspector Takbir Ahmad and a police party to a place near a stream in that kampong. At the scene a spade was made available and the accused dug holes at three different places and in each hole the guns and ammunition were found, soaked in oil.

As is to be expected, on returning to the station Inspector Takbir handed the exhibits to another police officer, ASP Kenny Woodworth PW4, who subsequently handed them over to the armourer for a report on whether the exhibits were serviceable or not. We do not know whether or not they were handed over directly to the armourer or through the hands of other police officers.

Nor do we know what happened to the exhibits subsequently, but at the trial Inspector Takbir produced them as the very things which had been recovered by him at the scene, and he also produced the armourer's report saying that the guns were serviceable.

The complaint before us was not that there had been no proof that the exhibits were serviceable, but simply that there was a "break in the chain of evidence", and the prosecution should have called as witnesses all the officers through whose hands the exhibits passed from Inspector Takbir to the armourer and back to the Inspector. We do not think there is merit in this point. The question was whether the exhibits the Inspector produced were the guns and ammunition he found at the scene, and as when he produced them as those very guns and ammunition there was no objection by the defence, it would have been a waste of judicial time to call all the intervening handlers. In our experience much judicial time is spent unnecessarily, notably in subordinate Courts, in ensuring no break in the chain of evidence. In our judgment, if the officer who picked up an object at the scene produced it and identified it as that very object, that is enough, and there is no need to call every other officer who handled it.

For this reason it is desirable for a police officer who picked up an object that is easily marked such as a gun, to mark it well, in case it may be needed later on as an exhibit. There are, however, objects such as blood samples and the like that cannot be easily marked; it is only in the case of such objects that it may be necessary to call everybody who has handled it - then only if there is doubt as to identity.

The only other point raised by Mr. Jagjit Singh that we should deal with is constitutional and is as follows. The accused was charged with a security offence, tried, convicted and sentenced in accordance with the Essential (Security Cases) Regulations, 1975. On 11 December 1978 the Privy Council held in Teh Cheng Poh v. PP [1979] 1 MLJ 50 that the regulations were ultra vires the Constitution and the trial in that case was a nullity, though the accused there had been correctly charged under the Internal Security Act. In January 1979 Parliament enacted the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1979 ("Act 216"). That Act was enacted under cl. (5) of Article 150 of the Constitution. The Act purports to validate the regulations retr