This is an application by the first defendant to dissolve and set aside an interlocutory mandatory injunction granted by the Court on September 25, 1984. The application also seeks an order of the Court to grant an injunction to restrain the plaintiff (the Bank) from selling or disposing some printing equipment (the said property) in the possession of the Bank. In addition, the first defendant asks the Court — (1) to make an order under Order 29 rule (2) of the Rules of the High Court for the custody and/or preservation of the said property by the Bank; (2) to allow the first defendant to inspect the said property and (3) to order the Bank to return forthwith the said property to the first defendant.

The Order dated September 25, 1984 was granted by the Court on the ex parte application by the Bank. The order restrained the first defendant from:

(1) interfering in any way whatsoever with the taking away, recovery or resumption of possession of the printing machines by the Bank, its servants or agents.

(2) refusing to allow the Bank, its agents/servants to enter into the premises of the first defendant to effect the removal, taking away and/or resumption of the printing machines at all times until the printing machines have been completely and totally removed from the first defendant's premises;

(3) refusing to afford all reasonable access entry and exit to the Bank's agents or servants to gain entry into the first defendant's premises at No. 285, Jalan Genting Kelang, Setapak, Kuala Lumpur for the purpose of effecting the removal, taking or resumption of possession of the printing machines.

It can be seen that the above order is an interlocutory mandatory injunction order. It was not disputed by the parties that the Court has the power to order an interlocutory mandatory injunction before trial. Such an injunction, however, is granted only in exceptional cases. In Wah Loong (Jelepang) Tin Mine Sdn Bhd v Chik Ngen Yiok [1975] 2 MLJ 109, Abdoolcader J., as he then was, in his judgment at page 111, stated the principle that "an interim or interlocutory mandatory injunction is never granted before trial except in exceptional and extremely rare cases." This principle was upheld by the Federal Court in Sivaperuman v Heah Seok Yeong Realty Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 150. Abdoolcader J., as he then was, in delivering the judgment of the Court said as follows:

"The first is that it is couched in prohibitory terms restraining the appellants until the trial of the suit from remaining in the quarters but it is in effect a mandatory injunction. Equity looks to the substance and intent and not to the form, and the interlocutory injunction sought and granted although prohibitory in language is mandatory in substance and effect…and as I said in my judgment in Wah Loong (Jelapang) Tin Mine Sendirian Berhad v. Chik Ngen Yiok, an interim or interlocutory mandatory injunction is never granted before trial save in exceptional and extremely rare cases."

The criteria for granting interlocutory mandatory injunction before trial have been laid down by the Federal Court in Gibb & Co v Malaysian Building Society Bhd [1982] 1 MLJ 271, 273. In that case the Court said:

"…The case however must be unusually sharp and clear… and the Court must feel a high degree of assurance that at the trial a similar injunction would probably be granted but we should observe that questions of degree are involved which depend inter alia upon considerations of hardship to the parties…The stronger the case of the applicant that the matters complained of are unlawful, the more likely it is that it will be found to be just and equitable that his interests be protected by the immediate issue of an injunction …Other matters of particular importance are, on the one hand, the ease or difficulty with which there can be compliance with a mandatory order and the extent of hardship which compliance will cause the respondent and, on the other hand, the nature of the injury and