This is an appeal under O 56 r 1 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 on the decision of the learned senior assistant registrar in respect of an application (encl 25) by the defendant, inter alia, for an order that the senior assistant registrar's order dated 13 July 1986 (encl 23) on summons for directions (encl 14) be set aside. In the order (encl 23) the reserve price was fixed at $216,000 and at the same time the said order was accompanied by a 'liberty to apply' clause. The appeal was essentially on two points, namely, the reserve price and the interpretation of the 'liberty to apply' clause.

If I may deal with the second point first and in this respect the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant maintained that with the 'liberty to apply' clause being made part of the order (encl 23) the said order in so far as the reserve price was concerned would have the effect that it was not final. When the plaintiff (the party who obtained the order) for example could not enforce the sale, the plaintiff could come to the learned senior assistant registrar to vary the price and likewise the defendant is also entitled to approach the senior assistant registrar to vary the said price. This argument could not stand in view of the facts of this case because even at the time of the hearing of this appeal the sale had not taken place. With regard to the actual meaning of 'with liberty to apply', I am inclined to agree with the meaning given in Word and Phrases Legally Defined, Vol 3, 2nd Ed, quoting Somervell LJ in Cristel v Cristel [1951] 2 All ER 574 at p 577 and it reads:

I think, with respect, that Langton J (in Abbot v Abbot (1931) 47 TLR 207 at p 209), in dealing with these words 'liberty to apply', used language which went beyond what was necessary for the decision of the case. He said: 'The expression 'liberty to apply' means what it says, namely, that leave was reserved to both parties to make any application concerning any part of the order at any subsequent time.' I think that is too wide a statement. Prima facie, the words 'liberty to apply' refer to the working out of the actual terms of the order.

It should be confined to the problems relating to enforcing or executing the order such as, for example, if there is some difficulty in its enforcement because of the terms of the order later found to be unclear or doubtful when faced with the actual situation on the ground, the party which obtained the order may approach the court again for its indulgence to seek clarification.

Regarding the reserve price as ordered by the learned senior assistant registrar, counsel for the defendant/appellant argued that that was a 'forced sale' value and not the market value as required under s 257(1)(d) of the National Land Code 1965. Counsel for the plaintiff/respondent pointed out that the defendant's counsel was present then and he did not submit any valuation report to counter that of the plaintiff's and he ought not to be allowed to re-open the case on the reserve price. Further the valuation report relied upon by the defendant in support of his application in encl 25 now on appeal was prepared on 2 May 1987. Whereas the valuation report submitted by the plaintiff for consideration in making the order of 13 July 1986 was prepared on 1 July 1986 and therefore the plaintiff's valuation report, in the absence of any other report, ought to be treated as being more reliable. Order 31 r 2(4)(c), in my view, gives the court and in this case the senior assistant registrar a wide discretion to decide when 'fixing a reserve or minimum price'. It may be noted that s 257(1)(d) of the National Land Code requires the registrar of the court to fix a reserve price 'being a price equal to the estimated market value' of the land. This provision too, as I see it, gives the registrar a discretion in that he needs only fix an 'estimated' market value.

The plaintiff's valuer gave two figures, namely, 'open market value' and 'forced sale value' with t