Mathew CJ:

This case was fully argued before the trial Judge, and no points have been raised on the appeal which would cause me to disagree with the full and carefully reasoned judgment of the trial Judge.

There are only two points which need consideration:

(1) Did the plaintiff, in the power of attorney that he granted to Subramaniam Chettiar in 1937, confer the power to substitute.

(2) Did the plaintiff ratify the acts of SRMM Kasi, which he purported to perform under a power of attorney granted to him by one SRMM Periakaruppan Chettiar, who had been appointed substituted attorney by Subramaniam Chettiar

The relevant clause in the power of attorney granted to Subramaniam Chettiar reads as follows:

To concur in doing any of the acts and things herein contained with any person or persons interested in the premises.

Generally to do and perform all such acts deeds matters and things in relation to the premises as my said attorney may deem expedient as fully and effectually as I could were I personally present. And likewise to appoint one or more attorney or attorneys under him with the same or more limited powers and such attorney or attorneys to set aside or substitute and such power or powers to revoke at pleasure.

And I do hereby agree to ratify allow and confirm all and singular whatsoever my said attorney or his substitute or substitutes shall lawfully do or cause to be done within the premises by virtue of these presents.

The last sentence of the second paragraph is difficult to understand, and follows no accepted form; but reading the clause as a whole, I am left in no doubt that it was the intention of the plaintiff to give Subramaniam Chettiar power to substitute, and that the clause in effect gives such a power. This being so, it follows that effective powers were given to Subramaniam Chettiar and by him to Periakaruppan Chettiar.

On the second point I agree with the reasons given and the conclusions arrived at by the trial Judge.

I would dismiss this appeal with costs, and order that the deposit be paid out to the respondent against her taxed costs.

JUDGMENT

Sir Charles Marray-Aynsley (S) CJ:

In this case the facts have been set out in the judgment appealed against and I do not think it necessary to repeat them.

It is necessary to consider, in the first place, whether the original power of attorney created a power of substitution of such a character that the substitute could himself substitute another attorney. If the first power of attorney does this, I do not think that there is any doubt that the second power of attorney does confer such power, though, of course, it is not effective unless the power is conferred by the first.

The power of attorney is badly drafted. It should be noted that the attorney of the attorney is given in the relevant clause (No 19) power to substitute and later on the donor agrees to ratify anything done by the attorney or his substitute. It should also be noted that the donor appears to have been satisfied with the substitution effected by the attorney, because, even after the death of the original attorney, he took no steps to regularise the position, as he could have done, by giving a fresh power of attorney. Taking cl 19 as a whole, I consider that there is a power to substitute and not merely to delegate. In any event, if I am wrong on this point, I think that the donor, who allowed Kasi to continue for nearly two years in the office of agent, although he was aware of the defect, if any, in the appointment of the latter, must be taken to have ratified the appointment by Periyakaruppan of Kasi.

For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal and have nothing more to add to the careful and Lucid judgment of the Judge who tried the case.

JUDGMENT

Wilson J:

In March 1937, the plaintiff gave a power of attorney to Subramaniam Chettiar in which it is stated inter alia:

And likewise to appoint one or more attorney or attorneys under him with the same or more limited