Choor Singh and Rajah J:

The next submission of Counsel for the defence was that there was no evidence that the accused inflicted the fatal wound with the intention of causing such injury as would in the ordinary course of nature cause death. To appreciate this submission it is necessary to look at the definition of murder as laid down in the Penal Code (Cap. 103, 1970 Edn.). The relevant sections are ss. 299 and 300:

299 Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.

(300) Except in the cases hereinafter excepted culpable homicide is murder: -

(a) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death; or

(b)if it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or

(c) if it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or

(d)if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death, or such injury as aforesaid.

The submission of Counsel for the defence was based on cl. (c) of s. 300 and this is also the clause on which the prosecution relied to bring home the charge of murder.

The defence submission was quite obviously based on the recent judgment of the Privy Council in Mohamed Yasin v. PP [1976] 1 MLJ 156. In that case Lord Diplock in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, said at p. 157:

Not only must the act of the accused which caused the death be voluntary in this sense (knew what he was doing, meant to do it; it was not accidental or unintentional); the prosecution must also prove that the accused intended, by doing it, to cause some bodily injury to the victim of a kind which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death ...

This interpretation of cl. (c) of s. 300 appears to be different from that of the Supreme Court of India. See Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab AIR [1958] SC 465 and Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala AIR [1966] SC 1874.

It seems to us that if there is an intention 'to cause some bodily injury to the victim of a kind which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death', then the intention is to kill and in that event cl. (c) would be unnecessary because the act would fall under cl. (a) of s. 300, namely:

(a) if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death.

In our opinion cll. (a) and (c) of s. 300 are meant to cover different acts, ie acts done with different intentions. The cases show that cl. (c) is meant to apply in circumstances where the assailant had no intention of causing death but has nevertheless intentionally (and not accidentally) inflicted a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Under cl. (c) once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the inquiry ceases to be subjective and becomes purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is irrelevant and totally unnecessary to enquire what kind of injury the accused intended to inflict. The crucial question always is, was the injury found to be present intended or accidental. As was observed by Bose J in Virsa Singh's case, supra, at p. 476:

It does not matter that there was no intention ... to cause injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.