Judges possess judicial immunity, limiting accountability for their judicial acts, and the Attorney General has the right to represent public interest in judicial review applications.

[14] Reading the written submissions and hearing the oral submissions of the appellant and SFC in this appeal, the appellant's complaint was against the Attorney General or SFC in appearing and attending the ex parte hearing for leave for the judicial review application. The appellant submitted that the putative respondents were not represented by counsel nor by the Attorney General and that the Government or Attorney General was not a party in this action. It was submitted that the SFC who appeared had admitted that he was not acting for the putative respondents nor as amicus curiae. It was submitted that the Attorney General or SFC was not invited to attend at the hearing and therefore had no locus standi and that the learned judge had erred.

[15] We had read the grounds of judgment of the learned judge. We had taken note that the Attorney General was not acting for the putative respondents nor as amicus curiae in these proceedings. The SFC however submitted that the Attorney General has wide powers to represent the Government and public interest under the Federal Constitution and has the right to appear. The appellant countered that the Government was not sued and not a party and the Attorney General or his officers had no right to appear under s 24(1)(a) of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 . The appellant also contended that if this was a public interest case as the SFC had submitted, the Attorney General did not certify in writing that it was in the public interest and failed to comply with s 24(2) of the same Act. On the facts and circumstances of this case, we were of the view that s 24 was not applicable and the Attorney General could not and did not rely on s 24 to appear.

[16] The question was, did the Attorney General and/or his officers have the standing to appear and attend at the leave stage of a judicial review proceedings notwithstanding that he was not representing the putative respondents. There are ample authorities to say that they have. We refer to art 145 of the Federal Constitution. Under art 145(2), it shall be the duty of the Attorney General to perform such other duties of a legal character and to discharge the functions conferred on him by or under the Federal Constitution or any written law. Article 145(4) provides that in the performance of his duties, the Attorney General shall have the right of audience in, and shall take precedence over any other person appearing before, any Court or tribunal in the Federation. It has been held that the Attorney General is a public officer under the Federal Constitution and that art 145 properly read gives ample power to the Attorney General to represent the Government and any body or person performing any function under the Federal Constitution: Tun Dato'Hj Mohamed Salleh Abas v. Tan Sri Dato' Abdul Hamid Omar & Ors, .

[17] In Indah Desa Saujana Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors v. James Foong Cheng Yuen & Anor, , the 1st defendant was sued as a judge in his capacity in performing his duties as a High Court Judge. There was an application to prevent the Attorney General or his officers from acting for the judge which was dismissed. The Court of Appeal in dismissing the appeal held that in the absence of particulars to substantiate them, there was no legal or factual impediment for the Attorney General and his officers providing legal representation to the 1st defendant and that the Attorney General was under a mandatory duty to provide the 1st defendant with legal representation in order to defend and protect the office and institution of the administratio