The court affirmed distinct elements of dangerous driving, rejecting the conflation of charges and emphasizing the necessity to treat each limb under s 41(1) separately.

Table of Content
1. driving constituting danger assessed based on circumstances. (Para 37 , 38)

"In order to justify a conviction there must be, not only a situation which, viewed objectively, was dangerous, but there must also have been some fault on the part of the driver, causing that situation. 'Fault' certainly does not necessarily involve deliberate misconduct or recklessness or intention to drive in a manner inconsistent with proper standards of driving. Nor does fault necessarily involve moral blame. Thus there is fault if an inexperienced or a naturally poor driver, while straining every nerve to do the right thing, falls below the standard of a competent and careful driver.

Fault involves a failure, a falling below the care or skill of a competent experienced driver, in relation to the manner of the driving and to the relevant circumstances of the case. A fault in that sense, even though it be slight, even though it be a momentary lapse, even though normally no danger would have arisen from it, is sufficient. The fault need not be the sole cause of the dangerous driving. It is enough if it is, looked at sensibly, a cause. Such a fault will often be sufficiently proved as an inference from the very facts of the situation. But if the driver seeks to avoid that inference by proving some special fact, relevant to the question of fault in this sense, he may not be precluded from seeking so to do."

[Emphasis Added]

[30] In R v. Ball & Loughlin [1966] 50 Cr App R 266 Lord Parker LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, stated at p 270:

"It is, in the opinion of this Court, perfectly clear that what is meant by "driving in a manner dangerous" is the manner of the actual driving [...]. [...] The case of EVANS [[1962] 47 Cr App R 62; [1963] 1 QB 42] now set out quite clearly that the rest is a purely objective one and that it matters not why the dangerous situation was caused of the dangerous manoeuvre executed."

[31] It appears to us from the decisions of the above cases that the important consideration in determining whether an accused was driving "dangerously" are as follows:

(i) the test to be applied is an "objective" one and not "subjective". Therefore, the opinions of the accused whether he was driving dangerously is immaterial;

(ii) the 'test' to be applied is whether an ordinary or reasonable person would have thought that the defendant was driving dangerously having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the nature, condition and use of the road, and the amount of traffic which is actually at the time, or which might reasonably be expected to be, on the road in question;

(iii) driving dangerously may involve speeding or reckless driving.

(iv) the danger caused by the driving to the public may be either real or potential;

(v) to drive dangerously must involve some 'fault' on the part of the defendant which caused the dangerous situation;

(vi) that 'fault' of the defendant does not need to involve either: [i] deliberate conduct or [ii] intentionally driving dangerously; and;

(vii) 'Fault' involves a failure, a falling below the care or skill of a competent experienced driver, in relation to the manner of the driving and to the relevant circumstances of the case.

[32] Section 41 (1), third limb of the RTA , inter alia, speaks of the manner of driving which is dangerous to the public. The manner of driving encompasses all matters connected with the management of the car by a driver when it was being driven. In our view, the speed of the appellant's motor vehicle is a relevant circumstance to the issue whether he was driving dangerously. If one speeds in an area where there are school children or on a narrow busy road, surely that could amount to "dangerous manner of driving" which create a serious risk of causing physical injury to some other person who might happened to be using the road, or doing substantial damage to property.

[33] Of course, not all speed creates a danger to the public. It depends on the prevailing

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