The Notice of Motion asked for an order of certiorari to quash the ruling made by the Industrial Court in the award handed down on August 30 1977 in Industrial Court Case No. 160/76. All other grounds set out in the statement accompanying the Notice of Motion were abandoned except the ground on jurisdiction.

The ground on jurisdiction may be classified under two headings which may be summarised as follows:—

(1) The Industrial Court committed jurisdictional error when it failed and/or declined to assume or exercise jurisdiction over the actual trade dispute referred to it by the Minister;

(2) The Industrial Court exceeded its jurisdiction in remitting the reference back to the Minister.

It is to be noticed firstly that the notice of motion itself seeks only for an order of certiorari without having any prayer for an order of mandamus or a general prayer for such other relief as the court may feel justified to grant although the affidavit of the President of the applicant union expressly referred to both orders of certiorari and mandamus. Since the Notice of Motion merely sought for an order of certiorari I will confine my judgment solely on that application.

A brief summary of the background may first be necessary. By a letter dated December 1, 1976, the Minister of Labour and Manpower referred to the Industrial Court the dismissal of 3 employees of the first respondent. According to the copy of the letter from the Ministry the reference appeared to have been made under section 23(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 as then in force. When the parties appeared before the Industrial Court on July 4, 1977 counsel for the company challenged the locus standi of the union to represent the three dismissed employees. After hearing arguments the Industrial Court handed down its ruling on this preliminary issue and this appears in the award handed down by the Industrial Court on August 30, 1977. The ruling of the Industrial Court appears towards the end of the award and for convenience it is reproduced below:—

"The court agrees that, in the normal course of events, it would have to adjudicate on a reference made by the Ministry. But once an issue is raised by either party as to its jurisdiction, the court has heard, and will continue to hear, arguments as to whether it has the jurisdiction to entertain such reference. It rejects as untenable the suggestion that it should shut its eyes to the issue raised and proceed with the reference.

For the above reasons, the court is of the view that the Reference in question should be sent back to the Ministry for the necessary remedial steps to be taken, either by the Registrar of Trade Unions and/or by the Ministry itself."

On the question of locus standi raised by the first respondent the Industrial Court gave the following ruling:—

"It would, therefore, be premature for the court now to decide as to whether the Union or NUPW by implication, has the right to represent the Claimants."

It was the contention of the first respondent here that the Industrial Court is possessed of wide powers to determine what are the issues relevant before it which it considers expedient for the purpose of disposal of a trade dispute. Therefore, it would be wrong to say that the ruling on the question of locus standi was outside the jurisdiction because locus standi was already an issue raised in the statement in reply submitted to the Industrial Court. This appears in paragraph 1(iv) in the statement in reply dated May 23, 1977 where it was brought out in clear terms that the company intended to contend that the union was not the proper union to represent the three claimants.

During arguments on the notice of motion counsel for the first respondent referred to the recent judgment of the Federal Court as yet unreported, Federal Court Civil Appeal No. 61 of 1977(1) where the test to ascertain whether the Industrial Court has jurisdiction was discussed and the Lord President said this:—

"To cons