Back
2024 MarsdenLR 3108
HIGH COURT MALAYA PENANG
TAMAN SRI BUNGA SDN BHD – Appellant
Versus
LEE KAH MUNG & ORS – Respondent
[Originating Summons No: PA-24NCVC-1560-12-2023]
The court ruled that an interim quia timet injunction requires proof of imminent danger and substantial damage, which the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate.
Headnote:(A) Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 – Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 – Specific Relief Act 1950 – Application for interim quia timet injunction dismissed as Plaintiff failed to demonstrate imminent danger of irreparable harm. The Court found that the Defendants' claims were not time-barred and that the balance of convenience favored the Defendants. (Paras 9, 14, 30, 36)
(B) Jurisdiction – The Court has jurisdiction to grant an injunction under s 50 of the Specific Relief Act 1950, but must be satisfied of imminent danger and substantial damage. (Paras 9, 13)
(C) Judicial Review – The Plaintiff contended that the Defendants must proceed via judicial review, but the Court found this contention to be a substantive issue for the OS hearing. (Paras 18, 22)
(D) Economic Loss – Potential economic loss does not justify the issuance of an interim quia timet injunction. (Paras 34, 36)
Facts of the case: The Plaintiff, a housing developer, sought an interim injunction to prevent Defendants from filing civil suits for liquidated ascertained damages due to late delivery of vacant possession. The Defendants issued notices of demand after the Plaintiff extended the delivery period. (Paras 4.1-4.9)
Findings of Court: The Plaintiff failed to prove imminent danger or irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favored the Defendants. (Paras 36-38)
Issues: Whether the Plaintiff demonstrated imminent danger and whether the Defendants' claims were time-barred. (Paras 14, 28)
Ratio Decidendi: The Court ruled that the Plaintiff did not meet the burden of proof for an interim injunction, emphasizing that fear of legal costs does not constitute imminent danger. (Paras 36)
Result: Application for interim injunction dismissed.
JUDGMENT
Introduction
[1] The Plaintiff has commenced this Originating Summons (hereinafter referred to as "OS") seeking a permanent quia timet injunction to restrain the Defendants from filing any civil proceedings premised on several notice(s) of demands already issued in or about December 2023. Simultaneously, the Plaintiff also filed encl 2, which was a notice of application for an interim quia timet injunction, pending the disposal of the OS. The Defendants thereafter filed encl 13, seeking to strike out the entire OS pursuant to O 18 r 19(1) Rules of 2012. Both applications (Encls 2 and 13) were directed by me to be heard together on 18 April 2024.
[2] Upon hearing learned Counsel with the benefit of their written submissions, I had, on 18 April 2024, dismissed both Encls 2 and 13 with no order as to costs and directed for the OS to be heard and fixed the same for hearing before me on 16 July 2024.
[3] The Plaintiff has since filed an appeal against my decision dismissing encl 2 and as such, I will hereinbelow set out the salient background facts, the parties' respective contentions and the reasons for dismissing the application for an interim quia timet injunction.
Salient Background Facts
[4] The key background facts as can be gleaned from the affirmed affidavits are mostly undisputed and can be summarised as follows:
[4.1] The Plaintiff is a developer of a housing development known as Granito located at Tanjung Bungah, Pulau Pinang (hereinafter referred to as the "said development"). The said development is an affordable housing development.
[4.2] The sale of the housing units within the said development is governed by the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 and the prescribed statutory contract in Schedule H of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the "1989 Regulations") was adopted for the sale of the units.
[4.3] The Defendants are individual purchasers of their respective units in the said development, whereby they have each executed individual Sale and Purchase Agreements (hereinafter referred to as "SPAs") all in the year 2017.
[4.4] Prior to the sale of the respective units to the Defendants, the Plaintiff had, through the Plaintiff's letter dated 21 August 2015 to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (hereinafter referred to as "Ministry"), applied for an extension of the original contractual period to deliver vacant possession of the units and for the completion of the common facilities for the said development from 36 months to 60 months, ie an extension of 24 months.
[4.5] The Ministry responded vide letter dated 25 April 2016 allowing the Plaintiff's aforesaid application for extension albeit only for an additional period of 18 months, ie from 36 months to 54 months (hereinafter referred to as the "Extension of the Original Contractual Period").
[4.6] In reliance of the Ministry's approval of the extension of the original contractual period to 54 months, the Plaintiff proceeded to enter into the SPAs with the Defendants whereby, through cls 25(1) and 29(1) of the SPAs, the time frame for delivering vacant possession was 54 months and not 36 months.
[4.7] The said development appeared to have progressed and upon completion of the same, the Plaintiff had then, on 30 September 2023, sent a notice of delivery of vacant possession and enclosing thereto with the "Borang F, Perakuan Siap dan Pematuhan" dated 28 September 2023, wherein notice was given to the Defendants that they are deemed to have taken vacant possession of their respective parcels upon the expiry of thirty (30) days from the date of the notice.
[4.8] On the same date, the Plaintiff issued the Defendants another letter attaching thereto several prior letters from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government in which the Ministry of Housing and Local Government had granted the extension from 36 months to 54 months thereto.?
[4.9] Thereafter, the Defendants, throug
