2013 MarsdenLR 2992
COURT OF APPEAL PUTRAJAYA
STADCO SDN BHD – Appellant
Versus
WOOLLEY DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: W-02(IM)-877-2011]
Long delays in amending pleadings can be prejudicial and justified explanations are necessary to allow such amendments.
Headnote:(A) No specific legal statutes cited within this judgment.
(B) Legal principle regarding inordinate delay in amending claims and its prejudicial effect on the opponent.
(C) Amendment to pleadings must arise out of same or substantially same facts as original claims.
Facts of the case:
The appellant's writ action dated 28 February 2002 sought to amend its statement of claim regarding alleged breach of contract and conspiracy by the respondents involving land sales. The appellant's application to amend was dismissed by the High Court citing inordinate delay and lack of justification for amendments after eight years.
Findings of Court:
Eight-year delay in application deemed inordinate; thus, amendment prejudicial to the respondent.
Issues: Whether the proposed amendments could be allowed despite significant delay previously detailed.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the necessity of just and equitable conduct in litigation; a litigant cannot exploit its previous procedural missteps to gain favorable new pleadings.
Result: Appeal dismissed with costs.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. appellant's initial claim and background. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5) |
| 2. proposed amendments to the statement of claim. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13) |
| 3. response and counterarguments from the respondent. (Para 14 , 15 , 16 , 17) |
| 4. court's decision to dismiss the appeal. (Para 18) |
[1] This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Kuala Lumpur of 28 February 2011 dismissing the appellant's application to amend its statement of claim to add a new cause of action.
[2] The appellant is the plaintiff at the High Court. The appellant's writ action and statement of claim was filed on 28 February 2002. In the writ and statement of claim, the appellant cites a company called 'Cherating Development Sdn Bhd' ('Cherating Development') as the first defendant. Cherating Development is not a party to this appeal. The respondent, Woolley Development Sdn Bhd is cited as the 2nd defendant in the writ action. The 1st defendant, Cherating Development, is the owner of several parcels of land in Butterworth. Around 1996/1997 the first defendant developed the parcels of land, constructing several shop offices in a project called 'Raja Uda Commercial Centre'. The appellant alleges that it had entered into 212 sale and purchase agreements with the 1st defendant on 6 January 1997 to purchase the shop offices. It is also alleged in the statement of claim that it is a term in the sale and purchase agreements that the agreements shall be binding upon the successors in title and/or permitted assigns of the 1st defendant. It is further averred in the statement of claim that the appellant agrees to pay the 1st defendant the full purchase price of the shop offices without waiting for their construction, in consideration of the first defendant giving the appellant a discount in the form of 16 free shop offices.
[3] The original claim of the appellant against the respondent was, firstly, for the tort of conspiracy to defraud, in that the respondent conspired with the 1st defendant to defraud the appellant; and, secondly, for breach of trust.
[4] The respondent's statement of defence was filed on 2 April 2002. The respondent denies the appellant's allegations.
[5] On 11 August 2004, after a series of case management dates, the appellant entered a 'default judgment' against the respondent. It is not clear from the order drawn up (and also from the Appeal Record) as to pursuant to which provision of law was the 'default judgment' applied for and obtained. Be that as it may, the 'default judgment' order of 11 August 2004 was eventually set aside by the High Court on 3 June 2010 (see the appellant's own affidavit at para 7.1 of the affidavit of Tan Aik Teck, a Director of the appellant company, affirmed on 8 December 2010 which can be found at p 292 vol 2(1) of the Appeal Record).
[6] The application to amend the statement of claim via summons in chambers was filed subsequently on 2 November 2010.
[7] On 28 February 2011, upon hearing the application to amend, the learned High Court Judge allowed certain proposals to amend; but refused to allow the remaining proposals. The present appeal before us only concerns the certain proposals to amend that were not allowed by the learned High Court Judge, in particular, the proposals:
(a) to add paras 12C and 12D; and
(b) to add new prayers in para 19, namely, prayers (3)(a), (3)(d)(i) and (3)(d)(ii).
[8] In this judgment, we shall focus mainly on the proposal to add the two new paragraphs to the statement of claim, namely, paras 12C and 12D, rather than on the proposal to amend para 19 of the same (to add the new prayers (3)(a), (3)(d)(i) and (3)(d)(ii)). This is because the proposal to amend the prayers at para 19 is only consequential to the proposal to add paras 12C and 12D. If the application to add paras 12C and 12D should be allowed, then, the application to amend the prayers at para 19 should also be allowed; and vice versa.
[9] The proposed new paras 12C and 12D read as follows:
12C. The 2nd