This is an ex parte application for leave to issue writ of possession under Order 47 rule 1. I gave oral judgment and ordered that leave be granted in terms of application.

My grounds are as follows:

(1) The plaintiff had obtained judgment to recover possession of the premises known as 96, Padungan Road, Kuching, by order of court dated September 15, 1977 in CS/K.120/75 which judgment was entered by consent of the defendant's legal personal representative. The 1st respondent being the widow of the deceased defendant who acted as legal personal representative, cannot now deny that the order is binding on her on the ground that she is not a party to the action, as stated in paragraph 2 of her affidavit in opposition.

In my opinion, she cannot blow hot and cold, admitting in one breath the premises was given out on licence to defendant and consenting to judgment for possession by the plaintiff and in another breath denying that the judgment is binding on her. There is no ground showing how she derived her separate interest in the premises if she has any.

(2) It was contended that the application by Summons in Chambers is not regular by reason that Order 54 rule 1 Rules of Supreme Court limits such summons to pending cause or matter only.

This application is made in consequence of judgment obtained for recovery of possession and such possession has not been recovered without the issue of writ of possession now being applied and this, in my view, is a pending matter.

The decision in Yap Hong Thin v Seenevasam [1970] 1 MLJ 143 referred to by respondent's counsel has no relevance; that being a case dealing with application for recovery of possession of rent controlled premises and this is distinguishable from the present application which is for leave to issue writ of possession of licenced premises.

(3) Counsel for respondent also referred to Order 42 Rules of Supreme Court on execution of judgment and urged that there must be judgment before the issue of a writ of execution such as the writ of possession now applied.

An order for recovery of possession obtained by the plaintiff is in my opinion, a judgment. Upon proper reading both Order 42 and Order 47 Rules of Supreme Court, a judgment seems to include an order of the court.

(4) Respondent's counsel also contended that no notice of proceeding had been served on the respondents and that this is fatal to this application on the authority of Tan Joo Eng v Siang Heng & Co Ltd [1957] MLJ 18.

Notice of proceedings as referred to in Order 47 rule 2 is vague. It may mean notice of judgment or order. The Annual Practice (White Book) 1961 at 1142 under item "notice" it is specified that application must give the defendant notice of the judgment or order and call upon him to yield up possession. These notices had been served on both the respondents and consequent to these they filed the affidavits in opposition and the counsel retained following which this application has been argued extensively. In my considered opinion the respondents had been given sufficient notice to enable them to apply whatever relief they deemed necessary to the court, in compliance with rule 2 of Order 47 Rules of Supreme Court.

(5) The counsel for respondent next argued that the applicant's affidavit supporting the application is defective.

I do not agree with this. Paragraph 5 of the affidavit states the true facts and is not misleading as contended by the respondent's counsel. His argument that the order for recovery of possession was made against the estate and not the respondents and therefore not binding on them is a mere sham. In the original claim the defendant was not a protected tenant. The premises was not rent-controlled and the respondents did not therefore derive any title to the premises and cannot claim to be in the same position as a statutory tenant.

The counsel also contended that the affidavit does not state the premises is rent-controlled. The basis of the original claim is th