Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

[1] This is a case of a road accident. The matter was tried by the sessions court which found for the plaintiff. It held the defendant to be solely to blame for the collision. The High Court reversed. It dismissed the plaintiff's claim. It did so on the ground that the sessions court had erred in its evaluation of the evidence. The plaintiff appealed to us. We allowed the appeal and restored the judgment of the sessions court. In cases of this sort we do not, as a general rule, produce written reasons for our decision. First, because these kinds of cases merely turn on an assessment of facts: they do not involve any novel or important principle of law. Second, because in matters that originate in a subordinate court, this court is the final arbiter and no further appeal lies to the Federal Court. That is provided for in s. 96 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 which, inter alia, states that an appeal shall lie to the Federal Court from "any judgment or order of the Court of Appeal in respect of any civil cause or matter decided by the High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction." Notice the words "exercise of its original jurisdiction". In the present instance, the High Court exercised its appellate and not its original jurisdiction. As such, on a reading of the plain words of the statute, the Federal Court has no jurisdiction over this case. Yet, the respondent before us appears to have moved that court.

[2] The main issue in this appeal is whether the High Court was correct in interfering with the sessions court's finding of pure fact based on evidential credibility. The plaintiff's case at first instance was that he was riding his motor cycle along Jalan Loke Yew. He was headed in the direction of Cheras. The defendant who was a taxi driver overtook the plaintiff and obstructed his path. Because of the suddenness of the defendant's movement of his vehicle, the plaintiff ran into the rear of the taxi and was injured. The defendant's version was that he was proceeding along Jalan Loke Yew when the plaintiff suddenly collided into the rear of the former's taxi. There were then two diametrically opposed versions presented to the sessions court. The sessions court preferred the plaintiff's version and found the defendant solely to blame for the collision. In doing so, the sessions court thought it likely that the defendant's taxi must have suddenly pulled up to pick up a passenger from the kerb and that must have accounted for the way in which the vehicle was driven. The judicial commissioner who reversed the sessions court took the view that as there was no evidence suggesting that there had been any person on the kerb reversed the sessions judge.

[3] Now, there was nothing improbable in the plaintiff's story when he said that the defendant taxi had overtaken him and obstructed his path. You will see that sort of thing happening everyday in Kuala Lumpur. It is a common occurrence in Kuala Lumpur for a taxi to suddenly pull up to the kerb for the purpose of either picking up a passenger or dropping one off. So the sessions court was clearly entitled to suggest that as a probable cause for the way in which the defendant's taxi behaved. This in no way flawed its judgment.

[4] The judicial commissioner does appear to have appreciated the role of an appellate court in a case such as this. That role was set out by Clarke v. Edinburgh Tramways Co. per Lord Shaw Dunfermline in [1919] SC (HL) 35, 36, where he said:

When a judge hears and sees witnesses and makes a conclusion or inference with regard to what on balance is the weight of their evidence, that judgment is entitled to great respect, and that quite irrespective of whether the judge makes any observations with regard to credibility or not. I can of course quite understand a Court of Appeal that says that it will not interfere in a case in which the judge has announced as part of his judgment that he believes one set of witnesses, having