The judgment establishes the principle that statements made in judicial proceedings are protected by absolute privilege, and truth serves as a complete defense in defamation claims.

[1] This is my supporting judgment to the judgment of my learned brother Nihrumala Segara MK Pillay, JCA. It is self evident that the words in the impugned letter written by the first defendant were a reiteration of the words spoken in the course of the proceedings on 13 August 1999 in the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court. According to the first defendant, he wrote the impugned letter to place on record the events of 13 August 1999 as he believed that he had a duty to do so as an officer of the Court and in the honest belief that the contents of the impugned letter were true.

[2] By sitting at the bar table (dressed in a white shirt, a tie and a black coat) and by assisting the first plaintiff in the course of his submissions before the Sessions Court judge, the second plaintiff, who was not a party to the proceedings, gave the appearance that he was an advocate and solicitor or a pupil in chambers.

[3] The contemporaneous documentary evidence, plainly and obviously support the defendants' case that the plaintiffs had informed the Sessions Court judge that the second plaintiff was a clerk in the office of the first plaintiff. The notes of evidence recorded by the Sessions Court judge at p 330 of the appeal record at vol 4 reinforces the defendants' case. It was recorded as follows:

P/P1 - Pohon record kehadiran kerani def

- En Alvinthiren Nair a/L Onikandan Nair

- (720129-08-6067)

- Occ. Kerani di pejabat Dato Rama.

[4] To compound the matter further, the answers given by Ms Lee Kwye Lan in her witness statement marked as D2 must invariably weaken, if not, destroy the plaintiffs' case. It is evident from the list of witnesses for the plaintiffs as seen at p 167 to 168 of the appeal record at vol. 2, the plaintiffs had intended, at the outset, to call Ms Lee Kwye Lan as their witness. Yet she was not called as a witness by the plaintiffs.

[5] At the trial, the main defences raised by the defendants were:

(a) absolute privilege;

(b) justification;

(c) qualified privilege; and

(d) fair comment.

The Defence Of Absolute Privilege

[6] The learned High Court judge erred in holding that the defence of absolute privilege raised by the defendants was devoid of merit bearing in mind that the impugned letter was:

(i) published in connection with judicial proceedings; and

(ii) an initiation by the defendants for sanctions to be imposed by the Sessions Court judge against the plaintiffs.

[7] Lopes LJ in Royal Aquarium And Summer And Winter Garden Society, Limited v. Parkinson [1892] 1 QB 431, CA, at 451 aptly said:

The authorities establish beyond all question this: that neither party, witness, counsel, jury, nor judge, can be put to answer civilly or criminally for words spoken in office; that no action for libel or slander lies, whether against judges, counsel, witnesses, or parties for words written or spoken in the course of any proceeding before any Court recognised by law, and this though the words written or spoken were written or spoken maliciously, without any justification or excuse, and from personal ill-will or anger against the person defamed.

[8] And according to the case of Henry Edmund Taaffe, Esq. v. The Right Hon. William Downes , Lord Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench in Ireland [1813] 15 ER 3 Moore 35 at 47, it is immaterial whether such proceedings take place in open Court or in private. It is also immaterial that the proceedings are of a final or preliminary character ( Bottomley v. Brougham [1908] 1 KB 584 at 588) and whether they are conduc