SPROULE J - The English law relating to dying declarations agrees in principle with ours, except that it is much more reluctant to allow such hearsay evidence to be proved even when the origin of it is clear. In England the proof of dying declarations as these is confined to homicide cases only; and our law has excluded the restriction that the declarant must be under the immediate expectation of death, with death ensuing without mediate improvement. The case of R. v. Mead (supra) makes it clear that the subject of the dying declaration must be confined to the res geslac, to the injury and the immediate circumstances of the cause of death. The fact that we have enlarged the scope of the rule makes it necessary to construe the words as strictly as possible. We think therefore that the statement should be rejected as not being part of the transaction which resulted in Musrin's death. And if the statement is rejected we have only the evidence of the boy, a child of tender years. Such evidence must be scrutinised with particular care and the Assessors must be warned, if there is no corroboration, to accept such evidence only after the most careful scrutiny. In fact corroboration is almost an essential and in the absence of any specific direction by the trial Judge to this effect we think the conviction cannot stand.

(The learned Judge then proceeded to deal with the details of the evidence.)