[1] Meneliti penghakiman Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Muhammed Hassan , jelas bahawa kaedah pentafsiran yang dipakai ialah kaedah literal. Pendekatan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam memakai kaedah pentafsiran literal itu adalah tepat. Menggunakan kaedah pentafsiran literal kepada perkataan-perkataan di dalam peruntukan s. 37(d) dan s. 37(da) akan membawa maksud bahawa apabila pihak pendakwa membuktikan seseorang itu mempunyai jagaan atau kawalan ke atas sesuatu yang mengandungi dadah berbahaya, maka anggapan pemilikan akan timbul. Manakala untuk menimbulkan anggapan mengedar dadah berbahaya, seseorang itu mestilah didapati memiliki, bukannya dianggap memiliki dadah berbahaya tersebut. (ms 733 b-g & 734 a-c)

[2] Keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Muhammed Hassan yang menyatakan kerana peruntukan s. 37 (d) dan s. 37(da) adalah jelas dan patut ditafsir secara literal dan justeru itu tidak timbul keperluan untuk mahkamah merujuk kepada ucapan YB Menteri di dalam Parlimen, adalah wajar sekali. (ms 735 a)

[3] Alasan-alasan penghakiman mahkamah ini di dalam kes Muhammed Hassan adalah begitu terperinci dan rasional. Ianya tidak wajar diganggugugat. (ms 735 d-e)

Per Abdul Malek Ahmad PCA (concurring):

[1] All the paragraphs in s. 37 of the Act have to be read in tandem irrespective of their placing. (p 744 c)

[2] Since the word 'found' is inserted in Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, s. 37(d) & (da), there must be a finding of possession first before the presumption of trafficking is invoked. Thus the decision in Muhammed bin Hassan was correct. (p 744 f)

[3] The correct proposition would be that any decision made, without the necessity of a prospective ruling, applied only to pending cases irrespective of whether at first instance or at the appellate stage. Such decision would not apply to cases already disposed of at the highest appellate level. (p 746 c)

Per Steve Shim CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) concurring:

[1] The primary duty of the court is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature in the words used by it. It is a well established canon of interpretation that the intent of the legislature is to be gathered from the words used and that if the words used have not acquired any technical meaning, they should be deemed to have been used in their ordinary meaning. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone in such cases best declare the intent of the law giver. (p 747 e-f)

[2] It is clear that under s. 37(d), a person shall be presumed or deemed to have possession and knowledge of dangerous drugs, unless the contrary is proved, once that person is 'found to have had in custody or under his control anything whatsoever containing' such drugs. The presumptions of possession and knowledge are obviously based or premised on primary or basic facts based on evidence. There exists a rebuttable presumption of law both of possession and knowledge of dangerous drugs consequent upon the establishment or proof of the basic or primary facts relating to custody or control of anything containing such drugs. It is equally clear that the proof of such basic or primary facts is arrived at by way of evidence. It is not based or derived from statutory presumptions. (p 748 b-e)

[3] The word 'found' in both sub-sections (d) and (da) of s. 37 must be construed to bear the same meaning. Such a consistent approach to construction avoids unpredictability and uncertainty in the law. It provides for clarity of scope and purpose. The word 'found' used in the subsections aforesaid, require 'evidential materials' to be established. The phrase 'evidential materials' must be taken to mean direct and/or circumstantial evidence or inferences arising therefrom. Clearly therefore, the word 'found' connotes proof by way of evidence. Such evidence is a pre-requisite in establishing the basic or primary f