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1954 MarsdenLR 36

HIGH COURT MALAYA PENANG
LEE BOON GAN (F) – Appellant
Versus
REGINA – Respondent
[Criminal Appeal No: 2 Of 1954]



Petitioner Advocates:Lim Kheng Kooi ,Respondent Advocate: JD Peterkin

JUDGMENT

Spenser Wilkinson J:

[1] The appellant was charged jointly with another accused with assisting in carrying on a public lottery under s 4(1)(c) of the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance, 1953. There were three charges, the first being in respect of 100 number lottery, the second in respect of 1,000 number lottery and the third in respect of 10,000 number lottery.

[2] The principal ground upon which appellant was convicted was that she was found in possession of three packets consisting of 3 wrappers and 28 slips of paper. The 28 slips of paper were satisfactorily proved to have been memoranda of stakes relating to the three types of lottery, and the learned Magistrate quite properly so held. The circumstances in which the appellant was found in possession of these documents were deposed to by the 2nd Prosecution Witness as follows:

"As soon as I entered the premises I got up to the staircase in the centre portion of the ground floor, I saw the 2nd accused running upstairs.

I followed him upstairs.

I saw him hand over three packets to 1st accused upstairs near the staircase.

He went to the open space at the back upstairs and was washing the clothes.

There was a girl washing clothes there and 2nd accused joined her.

1st accused attempted to go to the front portion upstairs.

I called to her to come back.

She came back.

PW 1 arrived upstairs.

She was still holding the three packets in her hand.

I pointed out to PW 1 the packets which she had in her hand.

I took the packets and handed them to PW 1."

[3] There was no other material prosecution evidence regarding the possession by the appellant of these documents and in a statement from the dock the appellant said:

"I did not collect any bets pertaining to 100, 1,000 and 10,000 number lotteries. I have nothing else to say."

[4] The first ground of appeal was that the presumption under s 11 of the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance can only arise after possession has been proved. The relevant part of s 11 reads as follows:—

"Any person ... found in possession of ... any account, memorandum, etc relating to a lottery shall be presumed until the contrary is proved to be assisting in a public lottery then in progress."

[5] I am of opinion that the possession referred to in this section is the kind of possession which has frequently been defined for the purposes of criminal cases. In Toh Ah Loh and Mak Thim v. Rex, [1949] 1 MLJ 54 the following passage appears in the judgment of the Court of appeal:

"Possession, in order to incriminate a person, must have the following characteristics. The possessor must know the nature of the thing possessed, must have in him a power of disposal over the thing, and lastly must be conscious of his possession of the thing."

[6] Again in the case of Chiah Tian v. Rex [1937] MLJ 105 at 106 McElwaine, CJ said:

"I think that a person is not guilty of the offence of possession if he is not aware of the possession. There must be some evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that the accused knew the general nature of the thing alleged to be in his possession, such as evidence of the length of time he had the object, evidence that he was expecting it, evidence of course of business, or any other evidence from which an inference of knowledge of the general nature of the thing can be inferred."

[7] It appears to me from the evidence set out above that the facts are equally consistent with this appellant knowing or not knowing what the packages were that were handed to her. That she had physical possession of them there is no doubt, but I cannot find anything in the evidence from which an inference can fairly be drawn that she must have known the general nature of these documents. The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor was unable to point to any circumstances from which such an inference could be drawn, except the allegation that the appellant attempted to go to the front portion upstairs. He agreed that in order to constitute possession for the purposes of s 11 there must be some

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