(Oral)

Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

This is the judgment of the court.

On 9 April 1996 the appellants before us obtained an injunction from the High Court, Seremban against the respondents. That injunction arose out of suit No: 22-20-1996, based on two agreements, one dated 5 January 1993, and the other, a supplementary agreement dated 19 June 1995. The injunction in question was obtained inter partes. Later, on 3 February 1997, the 1st and 2nd respondents applied to the High Court Seremban to amend the injunction obtained by the appellants. The summons for amendment was taken out on 2 November 1996. When it came on for hearing on 3 February 1997 in chambers before the learned judge, counsel for the appellants appeared and asked for an adjournment on the ground that her firm had only recently been appointed. The learned judge refused the application for adjournment, proceeded with the hearing and gave an order as prayed for in the summons.

On 26 February 1997 the appellants lodged a notice of appeal. The notice of appeal says that it is directed against the "whole of the decision" made by the learned judge on 3 February 1997. However, when the memorandum of appeal came to be settled, the appellants directed their complaints against the decision of the learned judge refusing the application for an adjournment of the respondent's summons.

Before us learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the learned judge misdirected himself and exercised his discretion erroneously in refusing the application for adjournment. We must confess that we were at first blush impressed with his argument. However, having carefully scrutinised the circumstances presented before the learned judge and as appearing in the record of appeal provided to us, we are satisfied beyond doubt that this appeal is devoid of any merit and must fail.

Whether an adjournment should or should not be granted in any circumstances is a matter entirely within the discretion of the court to which the application is made. The principles governing an appeal such as this are set out in the judgment of Hashim Yeop A. Sani FJ (as he then was), one of our most learned judges, in the case of Lee Ah Tee v. Ong Tiow Pheng & Ors [1984] 1 CLJ 26; [1984] 1 CLJ (Rep) 187, where he said:

The discretion of the Judge to allow or refuse an application for adjournment was a subject dealt with in depth by the Court of Appeal in Dick v. Piller. We agree to and adopt the following principles as regards the discretion in allowing or refusing an adjournment:

(1) Whether or not a party should be granted an adjournment is wholly at the discretion of the Judge. He would exercise the discretion solely upon his view of the facts.

(2) Prima facie this discretion is unfettered.

(3) The question to ask in any particular case is whether on the facts there are adequate or sufficient reasons to refuse the adjournment.

(4) Although an appellate court has power to interfere with the Judge's decision in regard to the granting of an adjournment, it would refrain from doing so unless it appears that such discretion has been exercised in a way which tended to show that all necessary matters were not taken into consideration or the decision was otherwise arbitrarily made.

(5) An appellate court ought to be very slow to interfere with the exercise of the discretion. But if it appears that the result of the order made below would be to defeat the rights of the parties altogether or that there would be an injustice to one or the other of the parties then the appellate court has power and indeed a duty to review the exercise of the discretion.

Dick v. Piller reviewed a number of authorities on the exercise of the discretion and amongst the cases cited was Maxwell v. Keun & Ors. In that case Atkin LJ set out some important guidelines in his judgment appearing at pages 653 and 657 respectively. It is useful to repeat them and they are as follows:

The court of Appeal ought to be very slow indeed to interfere with t