Ahmad Maarop J:

[1] The respondent was charged in the Magistrate's Court Kuala Terengganu with an offence of causing the death of a person by driving recklessly, an offence punishable under s. 41(1) of the Road Transport Act 1987 (RTA). The charge reads as follows:

Bahawa kamu pada 21.4.99 jam l/kurang 1.00 petang bertempat di km18.2 jalan Kuala Terengganu ke Kuala Berang dalam daerah Marang, dalam Negeri Terengganu, kamu sebagai pemandu M/Land Cruiser TD 3174 telah memandu kenderaan tersebut di atas jalan raya dengan cuai dan melulu dan telah menyebabkan berlakunya kemalangan jalan raya dengan pejalan kaki dan akibat dari kemalangan ini seorang pejalan kaki ini telah meninggal dunia. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 41(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 (Akta 333) dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen yang sama.

[2] On 29 April 2003, the charge was read and explained to the respondent. He understood the charge against him. He pleaded guilty to the charge and he understood the nature and consequences of his plea. Brief facts of the case were given (P1) and documentary exhibits (exh. P2 to P12) were tendered by the prosecution. The respondent admitted the facts. The respondent then submitted his plea in mitigation. The learned Magistrate accepted the respondent's plea of guilty and convicted the respondent and sentenced him to a fine of RM1,500 in default one month imprisonment. The Magistrate ordered the particulars of the respondent's conviction be endorsed on the respondent's driving licence. However, he did not disqualify the respondent from holding or obtaining a driving licence.

[3] Being dissatisfied with the sentence, the Public Prosecutor preferred an appeal to this court. The complaint of the Public Prosecutor was that the sentence was manifestly inadequate and that the learned Magistrate had erred in law in not disqualifying the respondent from holding or obtaining a driving licence under s. 41(3) of the Road Transport Act 1987 (RTA).

[4] At the start of his submission, the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor pointed out that words "cuai dan melulu" were used in the charge. However, he submitted that this had not misled the respondent or affect the conviction. Learned counsel for the respondent did not offer any submission to the contrary on the point. In connection with the matter raised by the learned deputy, reference may be made to Haji Abdul Ghani b. Ishak v. PP; [1981] 2 MLJ 230. In that case the first appellant was convicted of an offence under s. 2(1) of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 22 of 1970. One of the grounds of the first appellant's appeal in the Federal Court was that the charge against him was bad for duplicity as it combined three known offences by importing the provisions of art. 7(10) of the Malacca State Constitution. This ground was rejected by the Federal Court. In delivering the judgment of the Federal Court, Raja Azlan Shah CJ (Malaya) (as he then was) said at p. 246:

One trend in judicial opinion that is discernible in the cases cited is that the courts are more ready to impugn a charge as bad for duplicity where it contains more that one offence in the alternative. The case of Yap Liow Swee v. Public Prosecutor referred to by counsel on behalf of the 1st appellant is clearly distinguishable in that there were in that case clearly two offences disclosed in the charge as the charge alleged "recklessly or negligently." The indictment in Reg. v. Clow which arose out of a charge alleging that the appellant had caused the death of a person by driving a motor car at a speed and in a manner dangerous to the public was held not to be bad for duplicity as even if the elements of speed and manner of driving constituted separate offences it was permissible to charge them conjunctively if the matter related to a single incident. In Vernon v. Paddon the issue that arose for determination was whether a charge of using threatening and insulting words a