(Oral)

Gopal Sri Ram JCA (delivering the judgment of the court):

This is the judgment of the Court.

Yesterday, these two motions came before us asking for a stay. The first motion is filed in Civil Appeal No. W-02-864-2002. The second is in Civil Appeal No. W-02-852-2002. For convenience, we will collectively refer to the appellants in Civil Appeal No. W-02-864-2002 as the first appellant and the appellant in Civil Appeal No. W-02-852-2002 as the second appellant. The respondent, common to both appeals, is Metroway Sdn Bhd.

Now, when these two motions were called on for hearing yesterday, it occurred to us that the point for decision being a short one, it would be far more convenient, and the interests of justice served better, if we were to treat these motions as the appeals proper and dispose of them on their merits. We have ample jurisdiction to do this. See Syarikat Bunga Raya Timor Jauh Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Tractors Malaysia Bhd[1980] ; [1980] 2 MLJ 127 per Chang Min Tat FJ.

In response to our suggestion in the foregoing terms, counsel for the respondent asked for time until this morning to take instructions on his client's willingness to treat these motions as the appeals proper. We accordingly adjourned these motions to today. On being called, counsel for the respondent very properly informed this court that he had his client's instructions to consent to these motions being treated as the appeals proper.

The facts of this case fall within a narrow compass. The first appellant, Perbadanan Setiausaha Kerajaan Selangor is a corporation incorporated pursuant to a State enactment. It entered into a joint venture agreement with the respondent for the purpose of developing certain lands belonging to it. The object of the agreement, it is common ground, was to share the proceeds from the sale of houses that were to be constructed on the land in question. Later, disputes arose between the parties. It appears from the written evidence thus far filed that the first appellant was unhappy with the respondent and that it therefore appointed the second appellant under a new joint venture agreement for purposes of carrying out the development.

The respondent then instituted proceedings in the Kuala Lumpur High Court against the first and second appellants now before us and sought specific performance of the agreement it had with the first appellant. Pending trial, it sought and obtained an interlocutory injunction against the first and second appellants. The present appeals are directed against the grant of that injunction.

Having formed the preliminary view that these appeals had merit, we called upon learned counsel for the respondent to argue why the appeals should not be allowed and to support the learned judge's order. Having heard learned counsel for the respondent, we are satisfied that the preliminary view we formed is correct.

It was argued for the respondent that this is a suitable case for specific relief because the agreement between the first appellant and the second appellant was the product of a conspiracy between them directed at injuring the respondent. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that in consequence of the said conspiracy, the said agreement (for that is what we will call the agreement entered into inter se the appellants) was liable to be set aside by a court. With respect, we do not agree. It is settled law that conspiracy is an actionable tort, the remedy for which is damages. See Lonrho Ltd. & Anor v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. & Anor (No. 2)[1982] AC 173. The tort has been held to be actionable in our jurisdiction in at least one (1) case. See Loh Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Peglin Development Sdn Bhd & Anor[1984] ; [1984] 2 MLJ 105 per Wan Suleiman FJ.

Now, it is settled principle that specific relief is generally declined by a Court of Equity where monetary compensation is an adequate remedy. In the context of the remedy of specific performance, that principle finds statutory expression in s. 11(2) of