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1961 MarsdenLR 158

HIGH COURT (SINGAPORE)

BUTTROSE, J


KAHU ILLIAS
versus
NV VEREENIGDE NEDERLANDSCHE SCHEEPVAARTMAATSCHAPPIJ

SUIT NO. 1061 OF 1959

Decided On : 07-19-61

Advocates:
For the plaintiff - A. Muthuswamy; M/s. Muthu & Co. For the respondents - J. Grimberg; (Drew & Napier)

JUDGMENT

Buttrose J:

The short point for decision in this case is whether, in respect of the injuries which he sustained, the plaintiff has recovered compensation from his employer within the meaning of s. 20(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance (Ch. 157) hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance.

The plaintiff, a stevedore employed by the Singapore Harbour Board, was seriously injured when some bales of rubber fell on him while he was working in the hold of the defendants' vessel.

It is not in dispute that the plaintiff has accepted and received from the Singapore Harbour Board the maximum sum of $12,780 as compensation under the provisions of the Ordinance in full settlement of his claim. He has now taken proceedings against the defendants the owners of the vessel in which the accident occurred and who were the employers of her crew for damages for the injuries he has suffered.

The defendants contend that the plaintiff is debarred from recovering damages from them by reason of the provisions of s. 20(a) of the Ordinance which reads as follows:

20.Where any injury for which compensation is payable under this Ordinance was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the employer to pay damages in respect thereof -

(a) the workman may take proceedings against that person to recover damages and may claim against any person liable to pay compensation under this Ordinance, but he shall not be entitled to recover both damages and compensation.

The effect of that section as applied to the present case is that if the plaintiff has recovered compensation from the Singapore Harbour Board, his employer, he will not be able to recover damages from the defendants for loss of wages or for pain and suffering although such matters are not included in the compensation.

The plaintiff claimed compensation from his employer and the employer recognised the claim by payment, and the plaintiff accordingly, in my view, has recovered compensation within the meaning of the Ordinance.

The case of Elligott v. Nebbett [1948] 1 All ER 514 turned on the construction of the corresponding section of the English Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, viz., s. 30(1) which is substantially the same as s. 20(a) of the Ordinance. In that case an injured workman received payments from his employer on the understanding that they were not to prejudice his right of action at common law against a third party in respect of his injury, and would be repayable by him in the event of his succeeding in such action, but would otherwise be treated as payments of workmen's compensation. It was held that in accepting the payments on the conditions mentioned the workman had not "recovered compensation" within s. 30(1) of the English Act and so was not precluded by that subsection from recovering damages in an action against the third party. In that case the payment by the employers and the acceptance by the workman were entirely conditional. In the present case, in my opinion, the payment by the Singapore Harbour Board and the acceptance by the plaintiff were entirely unqualified and unconditional and the plaintiff cannot now recover damages from the defendants. It is to be observed that the plaintiff's acceptance of the compensation is confirmed by his solicitors' letter of 19 November 1957.

It was also argued, as I understood it, that because the written agreement under which the plaintiff accepted the compensation had hot been recorded as provided by s. 28(1) of the Ordinance, the plaintiff, although he had received the compensation had not recovered it, within the meaning of s. 20(a) of the Ordinance. There is, in my view, no merit in this argument. The recording of the agreement by the Commissioner for Labour is mandatory except in cases in which it appears that it should not be so recorded by reason of the inadequacy of the amount or by reason of the agreement having been obtained by fraud or undue influence or other improper me

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