Ambrose J:

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the District Court giving the plaintiffs possession of the front portion of the first floor of a house known as No. 72 Club Street, Singapore, under s. 15(1)(l) of the Control of Rent Ordinance.

This provision of the Ordinance empowers the Court to give judgment for possession "where the Court considers it reasonable that such...... judgment be...... given and is satisfied that suitable alternative accommodation is available for the tenant....

The learned District Judge found that it was reasonable that an order should be made giving the plaintiffs possession of the premises. He said:

On the evidence before me I came to the conclusion that it was eminently reasonable for the plaintiffs to require possession. They require possession to complete the building programme of the school to provide an assembly hall and a canteen. There are at present about 3,000 students in the school and it is hoped to increase this to 6,000 students. I think it is not only reasonable but essential that a school of that size should have proper facilities.

The other tenants in the premises occupied by the defendant and in the adjoining premises 73 Club Street had all moved away.

It is submitted by Counsel for the appellant that the District Judge was wrong in law in holding that it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to require possession. It is said that s. 15(1)(k) of the Ordinance has been suspended by the Control of Rent (Amendment) Ordinance, 1961; and that as an order for possession could not be made under s. 15(1)(k) it could not be made under s. 15(1)(l). I find no substance in this argument, as possession is not claimed in the present case on the ground that demolition of the premises in question is necessary in the interests of public health or town improvement.

The District Judge also found that suitable alternative accommodation was available for the tenant. He said:

I inspected both the present accommodation of the defendant and the accommodation offered to him with Counsel. In my view the accommodation offered was preferable to the present accommodation of the defendant. It had, as Mr. Wong Foo Nam said in his evidence, better ventilation and lighting.

Mr Leicester's chief complaint appeared to be that there was insufficient provision of lavatories, bathroom and kitchen. It certainly was not ideal but I did not see how it was any worse than the defendant's present accommodation where he had shared the one lavatory with all the families living on the premises and the kitchen and bathroom with another tenant on his floor.

It is submitted by Counsel for the appellant that the District Judge was wrong in law and in fact in holding that the alternative accommodation offered was suitable. He referred to the following passage in the District Judge's grounds of decision:

There was one point, however, on which I needed reassurance and that was whether the alternative accommodation was safe for the defendant to occupy. Mr. Wong, a qualified architect himself, had given evidence that the building was safe but I decided to act under s. 18 of the Ordinance and indicated to Counsel for the plaintiffs that I would make an order for possession on the condition that the plaintiffs produced a certificate from the competent authorities to say that the building was safe.

At the continued hearing Mr. Leicester objected to the certificate being produced although be conceded that I could have made an order for possession subject to the certificate being produced. I could not see the difference between that and the method I had adopted and ruled that the certificate was admissible.

The architect from the Chief Building Surveyor's Department gave evidence at the next hearing and said the building was structurally sound and fit for human habitation.

Counsel for the appellant contends that the District Judge erred in law in calling for a certificate from the City Architect certify