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1967 MarsdenLR 297

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR)

JWD AMBROSE, J


TURQUAND, YOUNG & CO
versus
YAT YUEN HONG CO LTD

SUIT NO. 471 OF 1966

Decided On : 02-25-67

Advocates:
For the plaintiffs - KA O Connor (Drew & Napier) For the defendants - AP Godwin (Donaldson & Burkinshaw)

JUDGMENT

JWD Ambrose J:

In this action the plaintiffs claim from the defendants the sum of $60,000 alleged to be due on 7 March 1966 under an agreement dated 17 February 1966 and interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum from the date of the writ, 22 March 1966 to the date of payment.

The agreement is alleged to be for the compensation of the plaintiffs by the defendants for vacating a rent controlled property known as No. 1 Bishopsgate, Singapore. It reads as follows:

17 February 1966.

No. 1 Bishopsgate

Heads of agreement

1 Vacant Possession: 7 March 1966.

(2)Compensation: $110,000 payable

(a) $60,000 on 7 March 1966 before possession.

(b)$50,000 by five equal monthly instalments of $10,000 each payable on the last day of each succeeding month. First payment 7 April 1966.

(c)Interest payable on balance from time to time due at 8 per annum at the end of each month at same time as the above-mentioned instalments.

(d)Bankers' guarantee to be given on 7 March 1966 guaranteeing payment of (b) and (c).

(e)Drew & Napier's legal costs to be paid by Yat Yuen Hong Co. Ltd.

The plaintiffs allege that the sum of $60,000 was due to be paid by the defendants under the agreement on 7 March 1966, before possession. They further allege that they are now and have at all material times been ready and willing to give up possession of the premises upon payment of the sum of $60,000 and upon compliance by the defendants with the remaining clauses of the agreement, but the defendants have failed so to pay or comply.

The defence admits the making of the agreement dated 17 February 1966 but raises two points of law.

On 13 May 1966 on an application made by the plaintiffs, it was ordered that the two points of law raised by the defence be set down for hearing and disposed of before the trial of the action pursuant to O. XXVI r. 2. The points of law set out in the order are these:

(1)Whether the agreement dated 17 February 1966 is unlawful for noncompliance with s. 2 of the Premiums on Leases Ordinance (Cap. 253) by reason of non-presentation forthwith to the City Council or the successors thereof;

(2)Whether the agreement is unenforceable, the premises being subject to the provisions of the Control of Rent Ordinance (Cap. 242).

I will now consider the first point of law. Section 2(1) of the Premiums on Leases Ordinance provides as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any landlord, or agent of a landlord as a condition of the grant, renewal or continuance of any lease or agreement for the tenancy of any building or part of a building, or for any person as a condition of giving up possession of any building or part of a building, to require the giving of any consideration whatsoever whether with or without reservation of rent unless -

(a) particulars of such consideration and of such building or part of a building are furnished in a written document; and

(b)such document is forthwith presented for inspection by the landlord or his agent or any person giving up possession as aforesaid to the city council if the said building or part of a building is situated within the limits of the city or to the rural board if the said building or part of a building is situated within the rural board area.

It is not disputed that the original and a photostat of the agreement in question were sent by the plaintiffs' solicitors to the chief assessor, Planning Department, City Hall, Singapore, on 21 March 1966.

The material parts of s. 2(1) of the Premiums on Leases Ordinance read as follows:

It shall be unlawful ... for any person as a condition of giving up possession of any building ... to require the giving of any consideration whatsoever ... unless -

(a) particulars of such consideration and of such building ... are furnished in a written document; and

(b)such document is forthwith presented for inspection by any person giving up possession as aforesaid to the city council ...

The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain

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