JUDGMENTBY: BUTTROSE J (WITH WHOM ROSE CJ AND TAN AH TAB J CONCURRED)

This was an action for damages for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff and alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in the driving of a motor vehicle. In dismissing the plaintiffs claim the learned trial judge said that he accepted the evidence of the defendant and found that he was not negligent in any way.

The substantial point taken on the appeal was the wrongful admission of what was described as a statement alleged to have been made by the plaintiff to an officer of the Legal Aid Bureau, who were at that time acting as his solicitors and also of the evidence of two of its officers in connection therewith in that they were privileged communications.

The position was that on the 22nd November, 1960, the day immediately following the accident the plaintiff was taken to the General Hospital where at about 7 p.m. he made a report of the accident to the police in which he stated that he was cycling along Havelock Road and on arriving at New Bridge Road junction a motor car knocked against his bicycle from the rear and he fell down.

It appeared that on the 19th June, 1961, the plaintiff consulted the Legal Aid Bureau who acted for him at that stage and on the 27th June and 26th July, 1961, the Director of Legal Aid wrote two letters respectively to the defendant alleging, inter alia, that the accident occurred as the result of a passenger in the defendants stationary car opening the rear nearside door and knocking down the plaintiff. Now copies of the reports made to the police by the plaintiff and defendant respectively were received by the Legal Aid Bureau at 9.40 a.m. on the 27th June, 1961, the date of their first letter to the defendant and I think it can be reasonably inferred before it was written.

In the light of the plaintiffs report it is difficult to understand how the matter contained in either of the two letters could have been written. It would on the face of it appear to be based not on the plaintiffs but on the defendants report. It is, I suppose, conceivably possible that a mistake may have occurred and that some confusion may have arisen over the reports which arrived together as to which was which. It is certainly an odd feature of the case. What is surprising is that the Director of Legal Aid observing, as he should have done, the difference between the plaintiffs report to the police and his statement to the Legal Aid Bureau investigator did not send for the plaintiff and clarify the position before writing the two letters referred to. Be that as it may, however, evidence was given by an investigator at the Legal Aid Bureau that the plaintiff made a statement to him on the 19th June, 1961, in which he, the plaintiff, attributed the accident to people in the defendants car suddenly opening the door as he came to the side of the cars left back door which knocked him down. He himself made no inquiries into the plaintiffs case and the statement was not signed by the plaintiff. The document, in my view, reads more like notes of an interview than a statement in the generally accepted sense of the term. It appeared that the plaintiff only went to the Legal Aid Bureau on one occasion. A copy of this statement was sent to the plaintiffs new solicitors at their request on the 7th August, 1962, by the Director of Legal Aid Bureau bearing no date and giving no indication as to when it was taken.

The statement is essentially different from the plaintiffs report to the police made the day following the accident and also from his pleadings and from his evidence at the trial none of which make any reference to someone in the defendants car suddenly opening the rear door as the plaintiff came alongside and knocking him down which is the defendants case.

The learned trial judge admitted the statement and also the evidence of the two witnesses from the Legal Aid Bureau with regard to it holding that though both the stat

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