JUDGMENTBY: BUTTROSE J

In this action the plaintiff claimed possession of premises at No. 203, South Bridge Road, Singapore, of which the defendants were monthly tenants on the ground that they had knowingly committed breaches of the Municipal Ordinance and the Building By-laws made thereunder affecting the premises which exposed the plaintiff to a penalty or fine.

Section 14 of the Control of Rent Ordinance (Cap. 242), (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance), provides that "no order or judgment for the recovery of possession of any premises comprised in a tenancy shall be made or given except in the cases set out in this Part of this Ordinance".

The plaintiff claimed it was entitled to possession under section 15(1)(h) of the Ordinance which reads as follows:--

"15(1) In the case of all premises such an order or judgment as is

referred to in section 14 of this Ordinance may be made in any of

the following cases, namely:--

(h) where the tenant or any other person occupying the premises under

him has knowingly committed a breach of any written law

regulating any business carried on upon the premises or of any

provision of the Municipal Ordinance or of any rule or by-law

made thereunder affecting the premises which exposes the landlord

to any penalty, fine or forfeiture."

The plaintiffs case was that by virtue of section 144(12) of the Municipal Ordinance which was in force at the material time, namely, in July, 1961, the building operations commenced or carried out by the defendants were deemed to have been commenced or carried out by it and it was liable for breaches and by section 144(10) of the same Ordinance it was liable to a fine and a mandatory order might be made requiring it to alter or demolish the building.

The defendants admitted that they commenced and carried out the building operations particulars of which were set out in the statement of claim and that the work was commenced and completed in July, 1961. Further it was not in dispute that the defendants carried out the work without submitting a plan to the proper authority or that there was a breach of section 144(7) of the Municipal Ordinance or that the work carried out constituted breaches of the Building By-laws.

It was argued that it had not been established in this case that the defendants committed the breaches knowingly as required by the section. This raised a clear cut issue of fact and was dealt with by the trial judge in this way:--

"In this case the evidence is that in November, 1960, the defendants

submitted a plan signed by themselves, their architect and the

plaintiffs to the proper authority. The plan was for the alteration to

the shop front of the premises. In April, 1961, an amended plan was

submitted. Both these plans show an unauthorised glass corrugated iron

lean-to roof over the open area at the back of the premises which was

to be demolished. The plans were approved on 21st November, 1960, and

19th May, 1961, respectively. In July, 1961, the defendants carried out

the building operations over the open area at the back of the premises

knowing full well that a covering over the open area was illegal. There

is no doubt about it that the defendants committed the breaches

knowingly."

I am unable to find any reason for disturbing the trial judges finding of fact with which I am in complete agreement.

In the light of this finding and in the circumstances of this case it is unnecessary to consider or pronounce upon the precise interpretation to be placed on the word knowingly.

In Sarah Cashin v Goh Kah Seng [1955] MLJ 52 at p 55 Whitton J. interpreted it in this way:--

"... the effect of adding the word knowingly appears to be that

before a tenant is deprived of this protection not only must he have

committed a breach which exposes his landlord

Click Here to Read the rest of this document