JUDGMENTBY: AMBROSE J

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the District Court giving the plaintiffs possession of the front portion of the first floor of a house known as No. 72 Club Street, Singapore, under section 15(1)( l) of the Control of Rent Ordinance.

This provision of the Ordinance empowers the Court to give judgment for possession "where the court considers it reasonable that such ... judgment be ... given and is satisfied that suitable alternative accommodation is available for the tenant ..."

The learned District Judge found that it was reasonable that an order should be made giving the plaintiffs possession of the premises. He said:

"On the evidence before me came to the conclusion that it was eminently

reasonable for the plaintiffs to require possession. They require

possession to complete the building programme of the school to provide

an assembly hall and a canteen. There are at present about

3,000 students in the school and it is hoped to increase this to 6,000

students. I think it is not only reasonable but essential that a school

of that size should have proper facilities.

The other tenants in the premises occupied by the defendant and in the

adjoining premises 73 Club Street had all moved away."

It is submitted by counsel for the appellant that the District Judge was wrong in law in holding that it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to require possession. It is said that section 15(1) ( k) of the Ordinance has been suspended by the Control of Rent (Amendment) Ordinance, 1961; and that as an order for possession could not be made under section 15(1)( k) it could not be made under section 15(1)( l). I find no substance in this argument, as possession is not claimed in the present case on the ground that demolition of the premises in question is necessary in the interests of public health or town improvement.

The District Judge also found that suitable alternative accommodation was available for the tenant. He said:

"I inspected both the present accommodation of the defendant and the

accommodation offered to him with counsel. In my view the accommodation

offered was preferable to the present accommodation of the defendant.

It had, as Mr. Wong Foo Nam said in his evidence, better ventilation

and lighting.

Mr. Leicesters chief complaint appeared to be that there was

insufficient provision of lavatories, bathroom and kitchen. It

certainly was not ideal but I did not see how it was any worse than the

defendants present accommodation where he had shared the one lavatory

with all the families living on the premises and the kitchen and

bathroom with another tenant on his floor."

It is submitted by counsel for the appellant that the District Judge was wrong in law and in fact in holding that the alternative accommodation offered was suitable. He referred to the following passage in the District Judges grounds of decision:

"There was one point, however, on which I needed reassurance and that

was whether the alternative accommodation was safe for the defendant to

occupy. Mr. Wong, a qualified architect himself, had given evidence

that the building was safe but I decided to act under section 18 of the

Ordinance and indicated to counsel for the plaintiffs that I would make

an order for possession on the condition that the plaintiffs produced a

certificate from the competent authorities to say that the building was

safe.

At the continued hearing Mr. Leicester objected to the certificate

being produced although he conceded that I could have made an order for

possession subject to the certificate being produced. I could not see

the difference between that and the method I had adopted and ruled that

the certificate was admissible.

The architect from the Chief Building Surveyors Department gave

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