Buttrose J:

This was an appeal from a District Court Which convicted the appellant of causing death by negligence under s. 304A of the Penal Code. At the conclusion of the hearing, I allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction and sentence but because it raised important points I intimated I would give my reasons in writing later.

The appellant was charged in the Third Criminal District Court as follows:

You are charged that you on or about 17 January 1959, at about 4.35 p.m. at Jurong Road, 8'bdms caused the death of one Ang Kwee Eah, M/31 by doing a negligent act not amounting to Culpable Homicide namely by driving motor bus SH 176 in a negligent manner and that you have thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 304A of the penal Code.

At the commencement of the hearing in the District Court Counsel for the appellant applied for particulars of the negligence alleged.

The application was refused by the learned District Judge on the authority of PP v. Chang Wan Seng [1954] MLJ 186 where Wilson J held that an accused person was not entitled to particulars of negligence under s. 304A because it was tantamount to a request for particulars of the evidence which the prosecution proposed to call.

The trial thereupon proceeded. The undisputed fact was that a motor bus driven by the appellant was involved in a collision with a motor lorry at the 8'bdms Jurong Road as a result of which the driver of the motor lorry was killed.

The eye-witness evidence for the prosecution as to the accident was supplied by passengers in the appellant's motor bus.

At the close of the case for the prosecution a number of versions as to how the accident occurred were disclosed. After carefully examining the evidence I was unable to arrive at any conclusion as to how the accident happened.

One witness said the motor lorry was stationary at the time of the collision while others said it was in motion and travelling along the road.

Another witness said that prior to the accident the bus swerved to the right on to its wrong side before it crossed the bridge while others maintained it only swerved to the right after it crossed the bridge. There were different versions as to the behaviour of the bus on the road prior to the accident and also as to its speed.

Notwithstanding this the learned District Judge called on the appellant for his defence and subsequently convicted him.

I shall deal firstly with the charge which in my view did not contain sufficient particulars to enable the defendant to know the case he had to meet.

The charge as framed was nothing more in effect than an allegation that the appellant did a negligent act in a negligent manner.

It is true that the charge followed the form set out in Ratanlal's Law of Crimes 19th Edn. 785 but these forms are only meant to serve as a general guide and bear no relation to any particular set of facts. Again it is not sufficient, as a general rule, merely to copy out the words of the section. The charge must be so framed as to enable the appellant to know with precision and in detail the case against him which he has to meet. It must have particular reference and be adapted to the facts of each particular case. An accused person must not be left in a state of doubt as to the allegations against him or as to which of several alternatives he is alleged to have been guilty of.

It is the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that the charge is on the face of it properly framed before an accused person is called upon to plead to it. Merely to tell the appellant in this case that he was charged with doing a negligent act negligently is in my opinion insufficient. On that ground alone in my opinion this appeal must succeed.

Similar views were expressed by Whitley A-G CJ in PP v. Lee Pak [1937] MLJ 265 with which I respectfully agree. That case was not cited to the Court in Chang Wan Seng's [1954] MLJ 186 case to which I have referred and from which I find myself compelled to dissent or to