Ambrose J:

This was an application under s. 375 of the Criminal Procedure Code for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court granted an order nisi directing the Chief Secretary and the Commissioner of Police to show cause why the writ should not issue. They stated in their affidavits that the applicant was detained under a detention order made under s. 3(1) of the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance, 1955.

The first point raised by Counsel for the applicant was that this subsection is ultra vires the Legislative Assembly established in Singapore by the Singapore Order in Council, 1955. The subsection reads as follows:

If the Governor in Council is satisfied with respect to any person that, with a view to preventing that person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaya or the maintenance of public order therein or the maintenance therein of essential services, it is necessary so to do, the Chief Secretary shall by order under his hand make an order directing that such person be detained for any period not exceeding two years: ...

It is to be noted that by s. 2 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance "Malaya" is defined as the Colony of Singapore and the Federation of Malaya.

Section 52 of the Order in Council provides:

Subject to the provisions of this Order, it shall be lawful for the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Legislative Assembly, to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Colony.

Counsel for the applicant contended (a) that s. 3(1) of the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance makes provision for extra-territorial matters, namely, the security of the Federation of Malaya and the maintenance of public order and essential services therein; and (b) that the subsection was ultra vires the Legislative Assembly because it was a subordinate legislature and not the legislature of a fully sovereign state and as such had no extra-territorial jurisdiction.

The Solicitor-General contended that the subsection did not have extra-territorial operation as it was limited to the making of detention orders against persons in Singapore. The subsection, however, is not so limited. In fact, a detention order made under the subsection against a person in the Federation is enforceable in the Federation under reg. 26 of the Emergency Regulations, 1951, of the Federation of Malaya. For this reason and also for the reason that the subsection dealt with extra-territorial matters, I decided that it had extra-territorial operation.

In support of his contention that a subordinate legislature has no extra-territorial jurisdiction, Counsel for the applicant cited the case of Macleod v. Attorney General for New South Wales [1891] AC 455, 458. In that case the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decided that the Legislature of New South Wales had no jurisdiction to enact legislation for the trial and punishment of persons who had committed crimes outside the territory of New South Wales. Counsel relied on the following passage from the judgment which was delivered by Lord Halsbury LC:

Their Lordships think it right to add that they are of opinion that if the wider construction had been applied to the statute, and it was supposed that it was intended thereby to comprehend cases so wide as those insisted on at the bar, it would have been beyond the jurisdiction of the Colony to enact such a law. Their jurisdiction is confined within their own territories, and the maxim which has been more than once quoted Extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur, would be applicable to such a case.

It is necessary to consider the true meaning of the maxim relied on by Lord Halsbury. According to Earl Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, it means "The sentence of one adjudicating outside his jurisdiction can be disobeyed with impunity." It is important to bear in mind that the expression jus dicere means to adjudicate; it does not mean to legislate. In my opinion, with the grea