Rose CJ:

The appellant was one of three persons charged with the following offence:

You are charged that you on or about 8 May 1959 at or about 1.00 p.m. at No. 56 Norfolk Road, Singapore, were members of an unlawful assembly whose common object was to cause hurt by dangerous weapons to one Ong Choon Huat and another person and that while you were members of that assembly one or more members thereof in the prosecution of the common object of the assembly committed murder by causing the death of the said Ong Choon Huat, an offence which the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in the prosecution of the common object of the assembly and you have by virtue of s. 149 of the Penal Code (Ch. 119) committed an offence punishable under s. 302 of the said Code.

The first and second accused were acquitted but the appellant was convicted.

Learned Counsel for the appellant, in his first ground of appeal, urged the following points:

The verdict of the Jury was imperfect inasmuch as:

(a) although there were three accused persons jointly charged with one offence, they returned a separate verdict in respect of each accused person, which, upon the facts of the case presented by the Crown, it was not open to them to do;

(b)even if the Jury were entitled to return a separate verdict in respect of each accused person, that verdict was an indivisible one having regard to the nature of the charge, and they were not entitled to bring in a verdict of "Not Guilty" against the first and second accused and a verdict of "Guilty" against Your Appellant.

Now the prosecution case was this. There was an unlawful assembly of some five or six persons whose common object was to cause hurt by dangerous weapons to one Ong Choon Huat and another person; in the prosecution of the common object murder was committed by the infliction of a necessarily fatal injury with a parang in the frontal area of Ong Choon Huat's chest; the murder was an offence which the members of the unlawful assembly knew to be likely to be committed in the prosecution of the common object. Of the five or six persons, witnesses purported to identify three, who were the three accused persons in the case.

We consider that there is no substance in the above ground of appeal in that the principal question for the consideration of the Jury was whether they were satisfied that the accused, or any of them, were amongst the group of five or six persons.

The answer to that question must necessarily depend upon the Jury's view of the evidence relating to each of the accused. Surprisingly, one of the grounds of appeal was that the learned trial Judge in his summing up erred in law when he said "the case of each accused must be considered separately". With respect to learned Counsel for the appellant, it seems to us that had the learned Judge directed otherwise he would have been Courting criticism. Looking at the charge as a whole, we are satisfied that the learned Judge put the issues properly and carefully before the Jury and correctly distinguished the cases of each of the three accused persons.

The only substantial ground of appeal was that there was no sufficient reason for the Jury to distinguish the case of the appellant from those of the other two accused; and that therefore the verdict of the Jury was unreasonable.

It is necessary, therefore, to consider the evidence relating to each of the three accused persons. The first accused was identified by Prosecution Witness Nancy, and by one Chan Chin Kiong. Both these persons stated that they only knew the first accused by sight.

As regards the second accused, he was only identified by one witness, Chan Chin Kiong, who stated that he only knew this accused, also, by sight.

The defence of both these accused persons was an alibi.

As regards the appellant, the third accused in the Court below, the matter was very different. The witnesses Nancy and Chan Chin Kiong knew him not only by sight but as a friend. Nan