Lee Hun Hoe J:

The respondent, Teck Guan Co. Ltd was charged before the learned Magistrate, Tawau, with an offence for possession of 13 logs bearing the property hammer marks of the North Borneo Timber Berhad Group, without lawful authority or legal right, under s. 30(g) of the Forest Enactment, 1968. It was acquitted. The Public Prosecutor appealed against the acquittal.

The facts may be summarised. Tham Chiok Kok (PW1) was an employee of Teck Guan Co. Ltd., Tawau and was authorised to buy logs from small holders. On 3 March 1969 he agreed to buy certain logs from a Malay. On 23 March 1969 somehow 19 logs arrived and were found in the log pond. On the same day these logs were scraped, graded, allotted shipping numbers and towed to a ship called 'Mono 2' for export. As a result of a surprise check on board by Masiron Rundi (PW5), a forest officer loading was stopped and the 19 logs were seized. Thirteen of these logs were eventually identified as bearing the property hammer marks of the North Borneo Timber Berhad Group.

There was evidence to show that the logs had been scraped and that attempt had been made to remove the marks. All the employees said that they saw the 19 logs in the log pond but none seemed to know how the logs got into the pond. Each employee tried to exonerate himself from blame.

Both Ng Ching Kwok (DW1) the secretary and Fong Terk Guan (DW2) the managing director of Teck Guan Co. Ltd gave evidence. They confirmed that Tham Chiok Kok (PW1) was authorised to buy small quantities of logs from shareholders. They stated that he had been specifically instructed not to purchase logs of doubtful origin. They denied that they had knowledge of the logs in the log pond and that they had bought the logs. They could not explain how the logs were found in their pond. There is no doubt that Tham Chiok Kok was either negligent or reckless in buying logs. He has since been dismissed.

The learned Magistrate held that knowledge was an ingredient of the offence and that mere possession was not sufficient to convict. He also considered that the explanation given by the defence was reasonable and probable. He found the accused not guilty.

The Public Prosecutor appealed on two grounds, namely,

(1)The learned Magistrate erred in law in holding that mens rea was an essential ingredient of an offence under the second part of s. 30(g) of the Forest Enactment, 1968 by reading the word 'knowingly' into it.

(2)Even if mens rea is an essential ingredient of an offence under the second part of s. 30(g) of the Forest Enactment, 1968, the learned Magistrate erred in holding that there were insufficient circumstances from which he could infer mens rea beyond reasonable doubt when the circumstances proved were such that mens rea could be inferred beyond reasonable doubt.

Although a considerable number of authorities were cited, I do not consider it necessary to go into all of them for the purpose of this case. The first ground concerns a matter of construction of s. 30(g) of the Forest Enactment, 1968. The relevant provisions read:

30 Any person who, without lawful authority of legal right-

...

(g) knowingly receives or is in possession of any forest produce which bears any property mark or in respect of which a forest offence has been committed or upon which the royalty or other payment due in respect thereof has not been paid or made;

..

shall be guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for two years and a fine of five thousand dollars.

The word "of" before the words "legal right" would seem to be an error. It should read "or" if it is to have any sense. With the exception of para. (g) all other paragraphs of s. 30 do not have the word "knowingly". It is argued that para. (g) has two limbs. Under the first limb, that is in the case of "receiving" mens rea is an ingredient, whereas under the second limb, that is the case of "in possession" mens rea is not an ingredient.

It has been generally interpreted that th