Ong Hock Thye CJ (Malaya):

This is an appeal against an order of the High Court granting an interlocutory injunction restraining the appellant his servants and agents from remaining upon the respondents' service station or removing any equipment therefrom until determination of the action between these parties.

Caltex, the respondents, are owners of a service station on Cheras Road, Kuala Lumpur. In August 1963 they entered into an agreement with the appellant whereby he was granted a licence "as a vendor of the company's products to enter upon and use the service station in common with the company during the continuance of this agreement solely and entirely for the purpose of carrying on the retail sale of the company's products at the service station subject to the terms and conditions contained in this agreement". By cl 16 it was provided that the agreement "may be terminated by either party on giving to the other 30 days previous notice to that effect, whereupon the licensee shall leave the premises within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the said notice by either party".

In November 1963 a second agreement was made between the parties for the loan of machinery and servicing equipment required for operating the service station. Clause 3(1) provided that the agreement "may be terminated by the company at any time giving to the licensees not less than 30 days previous notice in writing".

Pursuant to these clauses in the two agreements Caltex gave the appellant notice in writing dated 25 September 1968 terminating the agreements on 31 October 1968. Upon his failure to comply, a second notice dated 28 December 1968 was given to take effect on 31 January 1969. As the appellant still paid no heed thereto, action was commenced on 11 March 1969 by Caltex who applied also for an interlocutory injunction. The injunction sought was granted on 21 April 1969.

Without going fully into the facts and the merits at this stage, one thing is perfectly clear. Caltex had twice given the stipulated notice terminating the appellant's licence to occupy and use the company's service station. In fact he had been given more than three months notice to vacate. If the second notice was valid, the appellant became a trespasser on the company's premises after 31 January 1969. He maintained, however, in his affidavit in reply, that the notice was bad in law, that he should have been given reasonable notice and that the agreement had not been terminated by reason of a "collateral promise". It was alleged that he did not understand English - the language of the contract; he was not explained the terms thereof and he was assured by an official of Caltex that in the unlikely event of the company terminating the agreements he would be given reasonably lengthy notice so as to enable him to wind up his business and collect outstanding debts from his customers. As a further ground why the interlocutory injunction should not be granted, he pleaded that the terms of the agreement were oppressive; if he was required to comply with the said 30 days notice he would be placed in acute hardship which he did not foresee, whereas non-compliance would involve no such hardship on the company.

The simple answer is that every man should be held to his bargain if there is a concluded agreement and the terms are clear. It is implicit from what the appellant has himself stated in his affidavit, that the sufficiency of 30 days notice was on his mind when he signed the agreement. He was therefore fully aware of the stipulations as to notice. The agreement being in writing, parole evidence contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting its terms is inadmissible by virtue of s. 92 of the Evidence Ordinance. Equitable relief is out of the question. As Viscount Simonds said in Campbell Discount Co. Ltd v. Bridge [1962] AC 600, 614:-

I must dissent, as Harman LJ did, from the suggestion that there is a general principle of equity which justifies the Court in re