Mohd. Saari Yusoff J:

On 6 October 1994 at about 8.25 a.m., the plaintiff was a restrictee at Kuala Terengganu when she was arrested by the police. The ground of arrest stated in Lampiran "A" (enclosure8A) served on the plaintiff was as follows:

Kamu adalah seorang penganjur pelacuran di No. 4H Sam Mansion, Jalan Kampong Attap, Brickfields, Kuala Lumpur. Kamu hidup diatas hasil pelacuran melalui komisyen yang diperolehi dari pelacur-pelacur yang melacurkan diri di situ.

Between 6 October 1994 and 31 October 1994, pending the issue of restriction order by the Deputy Minister, the plaintiff was detained at Kajang prison.

In the restriction order dated 31 October 1994 issued by the Deputy Minister under s.2(ii) Restricted Resident Act 1933, the plaintiff was required to reside within Kuala Terengganu town for two years commencing from 31 October 1994. Under the same order, the plaintiff was placed under police supervision for the same period.

On the First Ground

For the plaintiff, it was argued that the plaintiff could not have engaged in immoral activity at No. 4H, Sam Mansion, Jalan Kampong Attap, Kuala Lumpur when at the time of arrest the plaintiff was under restricted residence in Kuala Terengganu for one and a half years.

It is common ground that under previous restriction order revoked by the Deputy Minister, the ground of arrest was the same as the ground of arrest in the instant case.

In Musa b. Salleh v. Public Prosecutor [1974] 1 MLJ 167 at p.169, Suffian FJ (as he then was) in that case states inter alia:

I am of the opinion that if on one set of facts a detention order under paragraph (a) is made by the executive it is open to them on the same facts to extend that order under subsection (1A) and that also on the same facts it is open to them after the expiry of that order to substitute for it a restriction order made under para (b). Be it noted that a detention order is not a conviction for an offence that has been proved against the detainee. If it were, then clearly he could not be detained again on the same facts. On the contrary a detention order is an administrative order; it is not to punish the detainee. The detention order is preventive detention, with a view in the words of s.8 "to preventing (the detainee) from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof". If the Yang Di-Pertuan Agung is on the one set of facts satisfied that with a view to preventing a person from acting in that way it is necessary to order his preventive detention in 1964, in my view it is permissible for him after a fresh consideration of the same fact to extend his detention two years later and that it is equally permissible for him after a further consideration of the same facts to make a restriction order against him in 1968.

On the authority of that case, I am of the view that the application on this ground is devoid of merit.

On the Second Ground

On affidavit evidence, the plaintiff was detained at Kajang prison from 6 October 1994 to 31 October 1994, a period of 25 days. It was argued that there was no need for the plaintiff to be detained at Kajang prison because facts and circumstances were known to the detaining authority as, at the time of arrest, the plaintiff was a restrictee.

With reference to affidavit evidence (enclosure 8A), the procedures under para. 6(a), (b), and (c) had been carried out in the case of first restriction order.

Further, it is argued that under the same affidavit (enclosure8A), para. 6(b) is inconsistent with para. 9(b).

In adverting to the case of Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors. v. Liau Nyun Fui [1991] 1 MLJ 350 relied by the plaintiff, I note that in that case the appellants/defendants had failed to account for the delay in issuing the restriction order against the respondent/plaintiff. In that case, there was a delay of six weeks from date of arrest to date of issuing the restriction order.

The facts in that case can be distinguishe