Terrell J:

The Plaintiff alleges that she was a secondary wife of one Lee Pang Seng and as such is entitled to share with the 5th Defendant, who was Lee Pang Seng's principal wife, in an n annuity of $300 per month provided under clause 18 of the will and clause 10 of the codicil to the will of Lee Choon Guan deceased. The first four Defendants are the Trustees of such will.

Clause 18 of the will directs the annuity to be paid to the widow of "my son or remoter male issue dying before the distribution of my residuary trust estate" and Mr. Page on behalf of the Trustees argued that "the widow of my son" is a description of a persona design at a and can only refer to the principal wife, the 5th Defendant. I am unable to accept this argument, which was not supported by Counsel for the 5th defendant, for the following reasons:

First, in clause 13 of the codicil the Testator declared that the word "widow" in clause 26 of the will only meant a widow who had been married with the full ceremonies of a first wife. If the Testator had meant that definition to apply to the use of the word "widow" in clause 18 of the will he could have said so, and in the absence of such definition the word must bear the ordinary interpretation which would be given to the word in matters affecting Chinese succession. Secondly in Malacca OS No. 30 of 1934 in the matter of the Trusts of the will of Low Guan Swi, deceased etc. a similar point arose and by an Order made upon a Summons in Chambers of the 11th December, 1934, Prichard J declared that the first Defendant who was a secondary wife was entitled as a widow of Low Kay Whay deceased under the will of Low Guan Swi deceased and by my judgment on the O.S. dated the 15th February, 1935,

I followed the Order of Prihard J and declared that the principal and secondary wives were entitled equally between them to the benefits to which "the widow of Low Kay Whay" was entitled under the ill.

Accordingly, so long as the decision in OS 30/34 stands, the point is no longer open for argument and if the Plaintiff can establish that she is a secondary wife she will be entitled to hare equally with the 5th Defendant the benefits referred to under the will and codicil of Lee Choon Guan deceased.

The evidence established that Lee Pang Seng who was the son of very rich parents first met the Plaintiff in 1918, having been married some years previously to the 5th Defendant as his principal wife. The Plaintiff was the daughter of very humble parents who at the time occupied a single room in Upper Chin Chew Street. At the time that Lee Pang Seng met her the Plaintiff's father, who had been a hawker, was out of work, and, for his status in life, had considerable debts. The Plaintiff was then 16 and of marriageable age and her parents handed a photograph of her to one Ah Chew or Chow Chew who was a broker who introduced singing girls to clients and he showed the photograph to Lee Pang Seng. I do not accept the suggestion that at this time the Plaintiff was a singing girl. In fact according to the evidence of Kwek Ah Lin, Ah Chew's wife, Ah Chew assured Lee Pang Seng that the Plaintiff was a virgin. Although I accept the evidence that the Plaintiff was not a singing girl, it is nevertheless significant that the Plaintiff's parents in approaching Ah Chew were clearly not trying to arrange a marriage with a man of their own class. Ah Chew was not the usual go-between but a person who carried on an ancient and not very respectable trade, which might well be described in less flattering terms than that of a broker. Through the broker the Plaintiff met Lee Pang Seng on two occasions and the matter was arranged. Lee Pang Seng paid the parents $1,000. Some of this was spent on the Plaintiff's clothes and some on a marriage feast for 30 persons. As the feast only lasted an hour or so, one cannot suppose these two items consumed even the major part of the $1,000. It was admitted that some of the money was spent in paying t