[1] The appellant was charged under s 9(a) of the Arms Act 1960 for having in his possession a pistol and three rounds of ammunition without an arms licence or an arms permit. The pistol and the three rounds of ammunition were not found in the house occupied by the accused but at a spot in a rubber estate pointed out by the accused. The spot pointed out by the accused was a pit four feet long, three feet wide and 2½ feet deep. This pit was covered by two or three pieces of wood which were removed by the police and in the pit underneath those pieces of wood was found a plastic bag. Inside this plastic bag was a stocking containing the revolver loaded with the three rounds of ammunition, the subject matter of the charge. A piece of cloth had been wrapped round that revolver. About an hour earlier the accused had taken the police to a different spot in another rubber estate from where a toy pistol was recovered.

[2] The word "possession" implies a physical capacity to deal with the thing as one likes to the exclusion of everyone and a determination to exercise that physical power on one's own behalf. It implies dominion and consciousness in the mind of the person having "possession" that he not only has such dominion but also that he can exercise it. In the present case if, for example, the accused had gone i alone to the spot in question and took out the loaded pistol from the place of concealment, the loaded pistol could be said to be in the possession of the accused as it lends support to the conclusion that it was within his exclusive knowledge as to where this pistol was kept concealed in the rubber estate. There may, however, be cases where a Court is not justified in presuming possession of the person who had mere knowledge of the articles concealed. A good deal depends upon whether the production was accompanied by information given by the accused in custody as would be admissible under s 27 of the Evidence Ordinance. Such information can be relied on by the prosecution as incriminating evidence against the accused along with the production or discovery of the articles in question but the mere production of such articles by itself would not necessarily prove his possession. It would at the most show that he had knowledge where the articles were kept or concealed. Thus, when it is proved that the accused made a statement to the effect "I have concealed the articles at a particular place and I will produce them" and if those articles are discovered in consequence of that statement, that would be evidence of his possession even though those articles were kept or concealed in another man's property, because unless he had possession he would not have kept them at that place. When, however, the accused without stating that he had concealed those articles merely produces them from a place to which other people could have access, it would not be sufficient to establish his possession even though the articles may be found carefully concealed and hidden because that is quite consistent with any other person having done so and the accused might merely have knowledge of it. In the absence of any incriminating statement made by the accused leading to the discovery of the articles, their production alone from another man's land cannot be sufficient to establish the accused's possession. It may at the most show his knowledge that the articles were concealed there. See Emperor v. Chokhey AIR [1937] All 497, Trimbak v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR [1954] SC 39, Naurang Singh v. Emperor AIR [1927] Lah 900 and Khuda Baksh v. King Emperor AIR [1923] Lah 238. It is the prosecution that has to establish accused's possession apart from his knowledge. PW1 while giving evidence in examination in chief stated "During interrogation accused told me he had a revolver." In cross-examination PW1 said, "In the course of interrogation the accused told me that he would take me to the place of the revolver." The accused subsequently did t