Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

[1] This is the judgment of the court.

[2] On 2 May 1999 at about 9pm, PW5 was seated at a food stall at Cha'ah located at the 132.5 km along the Johor Bahru-Segamat Road. He was with his friends. At about that time he noticed a white car coming from the direction of Segamat towards Yong Peng go off the road while avoiding another vehicle. This happened across the road from where he was seated. He saw a man later identified as the accused (the appellant before us) emerge from the car. PW5 and his friends went towards the accused. They wanted to help him. They were concerned to see if he was alright. But the accused acted rather strangely. He shooed them away. They then returned to the food stall. PW5 saw the accused open the trunk of the car, remove a blue bag and throw it away. He became suspicious and telephoned the police. While making the phone call, PW5 observed the accused standing alone near the car. About half an hour later, a tow truck arrived at the scene but then moved away. Shortly after that the police arrived in a Land Rover. On seeing them the accused began to run away. He was apprehended. PW5 then assisted PW6 (Corporal Rosli Hamid) who was among the police personnel who had arrived at the scene. He narrated to PW6 what he had witnessed and pointed in the direction in which the bag had been flung. The bag was then recovered. It was produced as exh. P6B at the trial. PW6 opened the bag. From within it was recovered a substance which upon subsequent chemical analysis was found to be 19,152 grams of cannabis. The accused was later charged with the offence of trafficking under s. 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ("the Act"). He was convicted and sentenced to death. He has now appealed to us.

[3] The main thrust of the accused's submissions is that the learned judge misdirected himself in finding that the accused knew that exh. P6B contained the proscribed drug in question, that is to say, that the accused had "mens rea possession" of the drug. Our attention was drawn to the following individual circumstances upon which the learned judge relied in arriving at his conclusion on this part of the case. First, that the accused had opened the trunk of the car, removed exh. P6B and thrown it away. Second, that he had chased away PW5 and those with him who had come forward to help. Third, that the accused look nonplussed when approached by PW5 and his friends. Fourth, that he had run away upon seeing the police. Learned counsel for the accused took us through a minute examination of the conflicting testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses on each of these elements. He submitted that the evidence of the witnesses concerned was at best equivocal and certainly wanting in credibility. The learned judge was criticised by learned counsel for the former's evaluation of the testimony of these witnesses.

[4] Now, it is true that when each circumstance set out earlier is examined individually it does not establish mens rea possession. But the essence of circumstantial evidence is not the strength of each individual strand of evidence. It is the combined effect of all the relevant circumstances when taken together that matters. As Thomson CJ said in Chan Chwen Kong v. Public Prosecutor ; [1962] MLJ 307:

That evidence was entirely circumstantial and what the criticism of it amounts to is this, that no single piece of that evidence is strong enough to sustain the conviction. That is very true. It must however be borne in mind that in cases like this where the evidence is wholly circumstantial what has to be considered is not only the strength of each individual strand of evidence but also the combined strength of these strands when twisted together to form a rope. The real question is: is that rope strong enough to hang the prisoner?

[5] In his written judgment the learned judge painstakingly analysed the several individual circumstances and considered them together. He asked himself the right que